Setting the strategy of insurance firms using economic capital: concepts and tools to manage risk-adjusted performance by Piccinini, Mauro
Dottorato "Scuola di Scienze Statistiche" 
XXVIII ciclo – Curriculum Scienze Attuariali 
 
 
 
 
 
Setting the Strategy of Insurance Firms using 
Economic Capital: Concepts and Tools to Manage 
Risk-Adjusted Performance 
 
 
 
 
Tutor Candidato 
Prof. Massimo De Felice Mauro Piccinini 
Matricola 1126949 
 
 
Sessione di Dottorato 
Anno Accademico 2015/2016 
  
 Tesi di Dottorato 
 
Setting the Strategy of Insurance Firms using Economic Capital: 
Concepts and Tools to Manage Risk-Adjusted Performance 
 
 
 
Facoltà di Ingegneria dell'Informazione, Informatica e Statistica 
 
Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche 
 
Dottorato di Ricerca in Scienze Attuariali – XXVIII Ciclo 
 
 
 
 
Candidato  
Mauro Piccinini 
1126949 
 
 
 
 
Tutor Coordinatore della Scuola 
Prof. Massimo De Felice Prof. Pier Luigi Conti 
 
 Referente curriculum in Scienze Attuariali  
 Prof.ssa Paola Verico 
 
 
A/A 2015/2016 
Contents
1 Context, motivation and summary of original contents 3
1.1 Context and motivation of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Structure of the thesis and summary of original contents . . . 5
2 Economic Capital and Proﬁtability in a Risk-Adjusted frame-
work 9
2.1 An Economic Capital revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 The risk-adjusted strategic framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1 Why proﬁtability should be risk-adjusted . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 The generic representation of RAPMs . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Proﬁtability measures in insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Risk measures in insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Capital measures in insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 Equity capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.2 Solvency II-consistent Economic Capital . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.3 Concepts and challenges in calculating, aggregating
and allocating required economic capital . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.4 Capital allocation and risk appetite: a conditional tail
expectation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 A single measure for proﬁtability, risk and capital . . . . . . . 44
3 Moving towards a risk-based corporate ﬁnance: more volatile
dividends 49
3.1 A traditional approach to project dividends . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Extension to an Economic Capital framework . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.1 Modelling the asset portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
CONTENTS 2
3.2.2 Modelling the dependency between market and under-
writing risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3 Calculating the Required Economic Capital . . . . . . 57
3.2.4 An EC-adjusted dividends model . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Results: more volatile dividends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 A few considerations on market consistent valuations . . . . . 64
4 Risk-based strategies to steer the company: A new hera in
strategic planning 66
4.1 The strategic planning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Using an EC-model to select management initiatives . . . . . 70
4.2.1 Description of the hypothetical composite Group . . . 71
4.2.2 Projecting P&L and B/S at time 1 under the base
scenariob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.3 Taking management decisions based on a RoEC opti-
mization strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Capital management strategies and dividends policy . . . . . 93
4.3.1 Capital management planning in practice . . . . . . . 93
4.3.2 Examples of dividends policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.3 Application to our case-study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 Using EC to link product pricing with ORSA . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.1 Three elements which are fostering a pricing revolution 98
4.4.2 A new RAP-target approach for product pricing . . . 100
4.4.3 Remarks and perspectives of this revolution . . . . . 106
5 Outlook of insurers' operating model, investors' views and
actuaries' role 109
5.1 A new EC-based operating model for insurers . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 A summary template to value the ﬁrm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 The rise of strategic actuaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Bibliography 121
Chapter 1
Context, motivation and
summary of original contents
1.1 Context and motivation of this thesis
An operational thesis focused on insurers' performance. In-
surance should be proﬁtable, just like any other business. However, the
insurance business consists in covering risks for policyholders, in exchange of
premiums which are paid in advance and can be invested in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Therefore, insurers must be safe, i.e. actively manage their own risk.
In order to do so, they must hold some capital, which can be used in order
to cover potential losses.
Depending on the standpoint of who deals with insurers, as recalled by
Bailleul et at. in [3], there are two potential extremes that may aﬀect insu-
rance:
• L'angelisme, according to which the ordre economique (i.e. share-
holders remuneration) gets ignored in the name of the ordre social (i.e.
policyholders protection), thus leading to an excessively capitalized
business which potentially is unsustainable in the medium/long term;
• La barbarie, in which the ordre social gets ignored in the name of the
ordre economique, thus potentially leading to high returns but insuﬃ-
cient capital to protect policyholders.
The responsibility of those who set the strategy of insurance companies is to
ﬁnd the right balance between such two extremes. In other words, Board of
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Directors and Top Management should use concepts and tools aimed at mea-
suring and improving (i.e. manage) the performance of the ﬁrm, intended
as ﬁnding the right trade-oﬀ between risk and return.
To the importance of setting clear targets based on which the strategy of
a company should be deﬁned, Borch dedicated his paper on Management
and objectives in insurance companies [5]; he thought that many studies
in the theory of risk have lacked a clear purpose and that actuaries have
estimated ruin probabilities and approximated claims distributions, without
being very articulate as to how their results could be used in the decisions-
making process of an insurance company, although the responsibility for
this does not fall entirely on actuaries.
Top management of insurance companies has not always been very ar-
ticulate when it comes to spelling out the objectives of the company, and
specifying the kind of information which is required to make the best deci-
sions in the light of these objectives. However, an important contribution
toward addressing this shortfall came from the operational approach towards
research and risk theory proposed by de Finetti [16], i.e. maximising the ex-
pected discount sum of the dividend payments which the company will make
over its life time1.
The current regulatory and market context makes it necessary for insurers
and actuarial science to further progress on the path indicated by de Finetti.
New standards aimed at ensuring a solvent and safe insurance
industry have been set up. Important investments have been made by
insurance ﬁrms in the past ten years in order to enhance the way they iden-
tify, measure, report and monitor risks (i.e. to set up and improve their risk
management framework). Such important investments in ﬁrms' IT systems,
data quality, and methodologies to measure/aggregate Risk-Adjusted Capi-
tal came alongside regulatory discussions around new risk-based and market
consistent regulatory systems (already in place in Europe, known as Sol-
vency II [24], and more broadly discussed in the context of the Insurance
Core Principles review and the new International Capital Standards).
1A complete literature review on how probabilistic models should be consistenly used
to inform decision making is provided by De Felice and Moriconi in [15]
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However, these led insurance business to become more expensive
and volatile. Such investments made insurance a more expensive (and
regulated) business than it used to be. In addition, market consistency
increased ﬁrm's balance sheet volatility, depending on market conditions,
thus reducing the predictability of proﬁtability, dividends and, ultimately,
shareholders' returns.
Therefore, insurers have been developing solutions in order to ma-
nage risk and capital, using the concept of economic capital. Mea-
suring risk through economic capital has become the way to directly link a
ﬁrm's speciﬁc risk strategy to its capital strategy, using the concept of risk
appetite [45] in order to manage risk and stabilize proﬁtability. Firms deve-
loped (sometimes very advanced) methodologies in order to aggregate risks,
assess their forward-looking solvency position, allocate economic capital to
single business units and measure Risk-Adjusted Performance (RAP).
Actuarial research, so far, has not provided a holistic, techni-
cally sound framework for such advances. Fostering an insurance-
speciﬁc research path on economic capital and Risk-Adjusted stra-
tegy shall be an important challenge for actuarial science in the
coming years. The ambition of this thesis is to contribute to a new re-
search ﬁeld aimed at setting a risk-based corporate ﬁnance (as described by
De Felice and Moriconi in [15]) and deﬁne the strategy of insurance ﬁrms
using concept and tools to manage economic capital and RAP: a research
path aimed at fostering the role actuarial science in serving the interests of
policyholders, shareholders, insurance industry and, ultimately, society.
1.2 Structure of the thesis and summary of original
contents
The research path underlying this thesis, agreed with the Tutor (Prof. Mas-
simo De Felice), aims at contributing to a new risk-based corporate ﬁnance
for insurance. We start by considering some of the key practical issues
the insurance industry is dealing with at a European and international level;
then, we apply concepts and tools provided by actuarial research to achieve
relevant ﬁndings/ solutions, whose results are shown in ﬁctious experimental
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cases (given the wide scope of the thesis, we had no ambition to treat in an
exhaustive fashion all the problems that are presented; therefore, sympliﬁ-
cations are sometimes used and highlighted in remark boxes, providing a
view on solutions and relevant bibliographical references).
The thesis is structured into ﬁve chapters. All of them (apart from the
ﬁrst one) provide some innovative ﬁndings or ideas, which are assessed in
speciﬁc case studies (in chapters 3 and 4) and described on a formal basis,
as summarized below.
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the research, outlining context,
approach and structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 describes the risk-adjusted performance framework which
the thesis is based on. In particular, this chapter describes:
• the four-steps economic capital revolution experienced in the banking
and insurance industries (section 2.1);
• why performance should be risk-adjusted and the key notation of a risk-
adjusted framework, also showing an original relation among Economic
Internal Rate of Return (EIRR), Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital (Ro-
RAC) and Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RARoC) (section 2.2);
• examples of proﬁtability and risk measures used in the insurance in-
dustry (sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively);
• the formal deﬁnition of Required Economic Capital and the most ad-
vanced techniques to measure and aggregate it (in particular, descri-
bing the nested stochastic problem and the Monte Carlo with proxy
functions solutions which have been recently tested/implemented), as
well as to allocate it to single business units (in particular, describing a
Continuous Marginal Contribution approach, able to consistently iden-
tify a ﬁrm-speciﬁc critical scenario) (section 2.5);
• how RAP measures can be used to combine proﬁtability, risk and ca-
pital together in a unique holistic view of the ﬁrm (section 2.6).
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In Chapter 3 we discuss how moving from a traditional to a risk-
based proﬁtability model leads to more volatile dividends. This
chapter starts from the traditional approach suggested by Dacorogna et
Al. in [11] and evolves it in a market-consistent and risk-based framework.
In order to do so, we specify a model to deﬁne the dividend policy of a
Non-Life company, according to the following 3 steps:
1. deﬁne a traditional approach to project proﬁtability and dividends (sec-
tion 3.1);
2. extend the approach to make it market consistent and risk-adjusted
(section 3.2);
3. run the model and analyze results (section 3.3).
The results of the model are followed by a few considerations on the recent
debate around market-consistent valuations (section 3.4).
Chapter 4 is the hearth of the thesis, and shows how an Economic
Capital model can be used in strategic planning to deﬁne an op-
timal risk-based strategy to steer a composite insurance group.
This sets the ground for a new way ﬁrms may set up their strategy and
plan/ monitor their business. In this chapter we:
• recap the key ingredients necessary to perform a business planning
exercise (section 4.1);
• deﬁne an original Economic Capital model (some of whose preliminary
results were already presented by the Author in [51] and [41]) for a
ﬁctious composite insurance group, in order to explore how manage-
ment intiatives (e.g. capital allocation driven by diversiﬁcation beneﬁt,
change in Strategic Asset Allocation or in the Underwriting strategy)
can be assessed and selected in a risk-adjusted framework, showing
how a strategy based on Return on Economic Capital (RoEC) leads
to very diﬀerent decisions compared to traditional strategies based on
Return on Equity (RoE) (section 4.2);
• discuss how ﬁrms set their capital management plans and dividends
policies coherently with their risk appetite and forward-looking sol-
vency assessment (section 4.3);
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• suggest an innovative 4-steps approach aimed adjusting product pricing
in Non-life business for risk and allocated capital (section 4.4).
Chapter 5 outlines the conclusions of the study addressing three
topics. Such topics are deemed by the Candidate to be key for the (im-
mediate) future of actuarial practice and research in an evolved insurance
industry, and are:
• the way insurance ﬁrms operate, so that risk is properly taken into ac-
count and decision making takes economic capital into account (section
5.1);
• the way insurance ﬁrms are valued, in terms of new metrics able to
help investors to make more informed decision when trading insurers
(section 5.2);
• the essence of the role of actuaries, which can evolve from pure technical
specialists to professionals equipped with the right skills in order to
steer, inﬂuence or control the strategy of a ﬁrm (section 5.3).
.
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Chapter 2
Economic Capital and
Proﬁtability in a Risk-Adjusted
framework
This chapter aims at achieving four objectives:
1. illustrate the meaning and historical references about Economic Capi-
tal in the ﬁnancial services industry;
2. explain why adjusting proﬁtability for risk is importat in order to mea-
sure performance of ﬁrms;
3. describe the latest advances in the insurance industry in terms of eco-
nomic capital measurement and allocation;
4. discuss how Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures can be used to com-
bine proﬁtability, risk and capital together in a unique holistic view of
the ﬁrm.
In order to achieve these aims, the next sections discuss:
• a brief historical background of economic capital in the banking and
insurance industries (section 2.1);
• the key notation of a risk-adjusted framework (section 2.2);
• examples of proﬁtability and risk measures used for insurance (sections
2.3 and 2.4, respectively);
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• approaches and techniques to measure economic capital and allocate
it to single business units (section 2.5);
• which measures can be used in order to consider proﬁtability, risk and
capital in a unique holistic view (section 2.6).
2.1 An Economic Capital revolution
Economic Capital became in the past few years the key metric in the ﬁ-
nancial services industry, linking the economic (cash-ﬂow based) view with
the balance sheet and solvency (risk based) view of ﬁnancial insitutions such
as banks and insurers. Albeit this has implied a revolution in the way the
market looks at such ﬁrms, the path towards embedding economic capital in
the way ﬁrms are managed has not been completed yet. Firms who will be
able to complete this evolution on a both timely and sound basis will end up
having a comparative advantage with respect to peers. In order to manage
such revolution and get the most value out of it, a number of tools have been
provided by academic and scientiﬁc research in the actuarial and ﬁnancial
sciences, as further described in this chapter.
Looking at recent history of insurance industry, four diﬀerent pushes can
be identiﬁed in the way ﬁrms evolved towards embedding economic capital
in the way they manage their business. A ﬁfth push is next to come, and is
expected to absorb much of the capabilities and focus of ﬁnancial insitutions
in the next few years:
1. the banking push: The revolution ﬁrst started in the banking
industry with the ﬁrst examples of economic capital based mea-
sures dating back to the '80s1, and then formalized and embed-
ded in the new regulatory framework of Basel II, published in
ﬁnal form in 2006, which requires banks to conduct an Internal
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP)2 to demonstrate
that they have implemented methods and procedures to ensure
adequate capital resources, with due attention to all material
risk;
1An interesting overview on this history is provided by Wilson in [52]
2Regulatory references are provided by the European Central Banks in [23]
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2. the regulatory push: A proper jump in the european insurance
industry was fostered by Solvency II after 2008, which explicitly
refers to the Solvency Capital Requirement as
the economic capital to be held by insurance and
reinsurance undertakings in order to ensure that ruin
occurs no more often than once in every 200 cases,
or alternatively, that those undertakings will still be
in a position, with a probability of at least 99.5% to
meet their obligations to policy holders and beneﬁcia-
ries over the following 12 months, as speciﬁed by the
Directive [24];
Solvency II is not expected to be left as a voice in the wilderness,
as it is perceived to be the ﬁrst step towards a worldwide revision
of the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) promoted by the IAIS3.
3. the methodology push: Both academia and insurers invested
great eﬀorts in order to design sound methodological solutions
and ensure compliance with the new requirements. To make re-
ference to a few important case studies, Aviva implemented the
ﬁrst Group-wide economic capital model consistently with the
new Solvency II requirements in 2009 and used it for disclosing
the year-end 2009 ICA4 results to the Regulator; since then, the
model (once called the S2EC model) evolved to the new inter-
nal model (Algo), which has been approved by the PRA on the
5/12/2015; likewise, Allianz launched in 2008 an internal multi-
year Solvency II Umbrella Project to meet Solvency II internal
model requirements, and the model was approved by BaFin in
november 2015; in Italy, Generali Group started the develop-
ment of the new Solvency II-compliant internal model in 2013,
receiving approval by IVASS in March 2016.
4. the IT push: Huge investments have been made by insurers
to upgrade their IT and data systems in order to (i) convert
3International Association of Insurance Supervisors
4Individual Capital Assessment, a risk-based self assessment of the ﬁrm's capital ade-
quacy, which must be communicated to the regulator. The requirement was introduced
by the UK Authority (once called FSA, now the PRA) starting from year-end 2004.
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to practice the newly designed methodological frameworks and
(ii) ensure that the new data quality regulatory requirements
would be met. Therefore, each model mentioned in point (3)
above proceeded together with huge eﬀort in terms of systems
and IT infrastuctured in order to ensure the quality of data used
by the models and enable the implementation of the designed
methodology.
As discussed, the momentum fostered by each of the four pushes above is
not over yet, however the fast movers among ﬁrms have gone far in those
direction and are now in a reﬁning phase. In other words:
1. on the banking side, the ICAAP exercises have been included in a
wider more comprehensive framework which regulators are using to
assess each ﬁrm, called SREP5 (see the manual issued by the European
Central Bank in [23]), where capital adequacy, risk, governance and
proﬁtability inherent in the bank's business model are all accounted
for in a unique holistic framework;
2. the Solvency II Directive has now been converted into ordinary law by
each of the Member States (albeit the transition from the old regime is
yet to be managed) and the IAIS is now focusing on three components
of what's been called by BCG the new insurance regulatory wave (see
[9]), i.e. ICPs, ComFrame and G-SIIs6 supervision and resolution;
3. new methodologies have been designed and are now being reﬁned, as
reported above;
4. IT systems have been upgraded and are now in production (i.e. they
are in the so called change management phase).
These four pushes enabled a revolution in how ﬁrms' risk and capital proﬁle is
measured and monitored. The next big push will be on the value generation
through economic capital management, involving the embedding of economic
capital in the day-by-day management of the business in terms of capital
management, business planning and new product design and pricing. These
three areas are further discussed in the next chapters. The rest of this chapter
5Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
6Global Systemically Important Insurers
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aims at providing a sound methodological framework in order to be able to
navigate in how Economic Capital can be used to extract value while being
equipped with the most advanced concepts and tools used in practice and
known to the literature.
2.2 The risk-adjusted strategic framework
The underlying idea of this thesis is that, in order to successfully plan, ma-
nage and monitor insurance business, three views are necessary, whose fea-
tures will be further detailed in the next chapters:
• proﬁtability view: ensures that the ﬁrm's business model is such that
it is sustainable in the medium long term (i.e. it makes money); the
highest example of document expressing the strategy of the ﬁrm to-
wards this view is the traditional 3-years business plan; the key metric
referred to this view is the net income;
• risk view: enables the ﬁrm's risk proﬁle to be constantly monitored
and actively managed within shareholders' risk appetite; the highest
example where this view is materialized is the Risk Appetite Frame-
work; the key metric referred to this view is the Required Economic
Capital7;
• capital view: ensures that the balance sheet structure of the ﬁrm is
optimal considering the ﬁrm's risk proﬁle and shareholders' cost of
capital and remuneration targets; the highest example of document
expressing the strategy towards this view is the Capital management
plan; the key metric referred to this view is the Available Economic
Capital.
Combining these three views toghether enables the design of the Risk Ad-
justed Performance Measures (RAPMs). Also, the dividends policy of a ﬁrm
(and thus its ability to remunerate shareholders while being sustainable in
the long term) depends on how it performs according to each of these views.
Now, to introduce the concept of RAPMs, let us consider an investor
who can invest in a ﬁxed set of d diﬀerent investment opportunities with
7Sometimes also referred to as Risk-Adjusted Capital
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Area of application Investor Meaning of Li, i = 0, ..., d
General investment Asset manager Return from d asset classes
Performance measurement Financial institution P&L from d LoB8
Loan/ product pricing Book manager P&L from d products
Table 2.1: Areas of application of RAPMs and interpretation of losses
losses represented by the random variables L1 , ..., Ld. The alternative inter-
pretations, depending on the area of application, can be as shown in Table
2.1.
The objective of a RAPM is to provide a uniform measure of performance
that Management can use to compare economic proﬁtability of businesses
with diﬀerent sources of risk and diﬀerent capital requirements. This is
made by:
• making risky returns directly comparable, i.e. by normalizing returns
oﬀered by diﬀerent opportunities for the risks taken, and
• measuring value creation, i.e. by comparing the normalized returns
against a common cost of capital or hudle rate to assess whether the
opportunity is creating or destroying value.
As such, there are a number of properties that are desirable for any eﬀective
RAPM. In particular, the measure should be:
• consistent : deﬁned and calculated consistently across business lines
and products (and across diﬀerent entities at Group level);
• economic: based on economic measures that are sensitive to proﬁts
generated and reﬂect the actual risks involved (i.e. it relates to the
actual risks being run - to which shareholders are exposed - and makes
an allowance for uncertainty within cashﬂows);
• eﬃcient : can be implemented easily, is based on data which are avail-
able, its calculation can be performed quickly, is straightforward to
use;
• auditable: is transparent and its calculation can be easily replicated in
order to gain credibility and perform sensitivity analyses;
• communicatable: simple enough for staﬀ to understand and communi-
cate to senior management and to the Regulator;
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• suitable for `retrospective' applications: can be used for evaluating the
historical performance (e.g. to assess company's results) and can be
calculated at the required level of granularity in line with Management
responsibility (e.g. at Business Unit level);
• suitable for `prospective' applications: can be used for strategic and
business decisions such as business planning, capital allocation and
new business pricing.
2.2.1 Why proﬁtability should be risk-adjusted
Until the fostering of portfolio theory in the 1960s, the problem of measu-
ring the performance of portfolio managers had initially been addressed by
comparing the total returns of a managed portfolio with that of a random un-
managed portfolio (the dartboard portfolio). The latter was then replaced
by an unmanaged market portfolio (or, better, capitalization-weighted port-
folio consisting of the entire market) and, thereafter, by benchmarks built to
reﬂect more closely the desired characteristics of the portfolio under evalu-
ation (e.g. the risk-appetite, time-horizon of investment etc.)9. As such, the
common measure of performance usually was the total return.
The main drawback of total return measures is that they ignore the
fact that investors can increase expected returns simply by accepting higher
level of risk. However, investors do not like risk, and hence they require
compensation in the form of a risk premium for any uncertainty embedded
in investment outcomes. These risk premia can be easily observed, mea-
sured and, actually, acquired on an open market, and hence, when included
in a return measure, they do not reﬂect any particular skill of the investor,
but simply their willingness to undertake more risk. The underlying idea
in making the investment performance measure risk-adjusted is that after
such adjustment is applied the measure should not be sensitive to increased
return results achieved by simply increasing exposure to risk.
The following paragraphs provide an overview on two well known risk-
adjusted return measures.
Sharpe ratio as the ﬁrst RAPM. The Sharpe ratio was introduced in
[47]. It is given by the ratio between the extra-return (also called risk pre-
9Such benchmark approach still today represents the standard market practice in the
pensions sector
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mium) of the portfolio (or line of business or asset class) above the risk-free
rate of return over the standard deviation of the return itself. The ratio can
be interpreted as the reward per unit of risk, i.e.
SRA =
rA − rf
σA
(2.1)
The main drawback of Sharpe ratio is that it has no units, and hence is
not directly comparable with benchmarking returns.
Modigliani's RAP. Modigliani's Risk-Adjusted Performance (Modigliani's
RAP) aims at measuring performance of any managed portfolio against a
notional unmanageable market portfolio. The idea is to use the market
opportunity cost of risk to adjust all portfolios and put them on the same
level of risk with the market. In this way, all portfolios will have the same
risk proﬁle, and will therefore be directly comparable.
Namely, for any portfolio A having total return rA and standard deviation
σA, we follow a 2-steps procedure:
• a new portfolio A′ is constructed, in which we de-leverage (i.e. sell a
share to put in risk-free asset) or leverage (i.e. borrow at risk-free rate
to buy a share) by an amount dA
dA =
σM
σA
− 1 (2.2)
The level of (de-)leveraging is such that the risk of the new portfolio
is equal to the market's, so that σA = σM ;
• Modigliani's RAP is equal to the total return on the risk-adjusted
portfolio
RAPA = rA′ = (1 + dA) rA − dArf
which, by using 2.2 and 2.1, can be rewritten as
RAPA = rf + (rA − rf ) σM
σA
(2.3)
RAPA = rf + SRAσM (2.4)
RAPA = rA + SRA (σM − σA) (2.5)
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Figure 2.1: Modigliani's RAP (M2) is directly comparable with market re-
turns
Portfolio i ri σi SRi RAPi
A 5% 5% 0.6 11%
B 9% 35% 0.2 5%
M 7% 15% 0.33 7%
Table 2.2: Sharpe ratio and Modigliani's RAP for two illustrative portfolios
The last formula allows us to obtain graphical interpretation of Modigliani's
RAP on the same risk-return chart, used for Sharpe ratio. Indeed, if one
draws a vertical line from the point representing market portfolio (see Figure
2.1), the point of intersection of this line with the line that determines Sharpe
Ratio for a portfolio will represent Modigliani's RAP of this portfolio.
Unlike the Sharpe ratio, Modigliani's RAP is expressed in percentage or
basis points, hence it is directly comparable with market returns.
Let A and B be two portofolios yielding the rate of return of rA = 5%
and rB = 9%, where the market index gives rM = 7% and the risk free rate
is 2%, and with standard deviation σA = 5%, σB = 35% and σM = 15%.
By applying the 2.1 and the 2.5, we obtain the results shown in Table
2.2.
Looking at total return, at the Sharpe ratio and how they relate to each
other, one could conclude that Portfolio A outperforms the market (i.e. al-
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though reaching a lower return, the level of risk undertaken is more than pro-
portionally lower), while Portfolio B underperforms the market and Portfolio
A.
Using Modigliani's RAP enables to quantify the extent of such perfor-
mance diﬀerences, so we conclude that in a risk-adjusted world portfolio A
outperformes the market by 4%, which in turn outperforms B by 2%.
2.2.2 The generic representation of RAPMs
As a number of studies pointed out (such as [25]), Sharpe measures and
other measures within a CAPM framework (such as Beta) present calibration
issues due to the lack of market data and do not consider the risk and
costs associated with default. This led to the design and development of
performance measure able to allow for the whole risk inherent to a given
portfolio.
According to a research performed by Bank of America [53], the Banking
Trust developed the RAROC methodology in the late 1970s and the original
intent was to measure the risk of the bank's credit portfolio and the amount
of equity capital necessary to limit the bank to a speciﬁc probability of loss.
By 1995, Bank of America had also developed the capability to allocate ca-
pital and calculate risk adjusted performance down to the level of individual
products and transactions.
In most cases, RAPMs are deﬁned either as the ratio of the proﬁtability
of the business over a measure of the risk undertaken (see 2.6 below), or
as the ratio of the risk adjusted proﬁtability over the capital invested (see
2.7). The following formulae represent, respectively, the concept of Return
on Risk Adjusted Capital (where the proﬁtability level is compared to the
amount of capital invested in the risky asset plus a risk-adjustement) and of
Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (i.e. the ratio of proﬁtability normalized
for the risk taken over the allocated capital); hence, they provide an excellent
example of how the three views above, i.e. proﬁtability, risk and capital, can
be analyzed jointly.
RAPM1(RoRAC) =
Return
Capital +Risk Adjustment
(2.6)
RAPM2(RARoC) =
Return−Risk Adjustment
Capital
(2.7)
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Remark 2.1 (on the Risk Adjustment in a RoRAC measure) Look-
ing at the two deﬁnitions of RAPMs above, one could ask about the nature
of the risk adjustment to be applied to capital or return:
• let us consider the available capital of a company: this is a form of
non-adjusted capital, which could in theory be very close to zero;
• now, the corresponding risk-adjusted capital (which we call REC in this
thesis, or Required Economic Capital) could well be higher than the
capital, as it represents the additional amount of capital the company
should hold in order to ensure it will be solvent over the next 1-year
with an "alpha" level of conﬁdence (this "alpha" represents the risk
appetite: the lower the risk appetite, the higher the risk adjustment,
and vice-versa);
• of course, if the available capital of a company is higher than its REC,
then the risk adjustment is negative (and the company is able to pay
dividends, as we will further discuss in chapter 4).
The following sections focus on each of the three item in an insurance
context: proﬁtability, risk and capital. First, however, we provide an exam-
ple of how a traditional proﬁtability measure such as the Internal Rate of
Return (IRR) can be risk-adjusted.
Example: The Economic Internal Rate of Return. The Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) is one the most widely used ﬁnancial measures to
evaluate investments that generate cash ﬂows extended over some interval
in time; it can be used to rank several alternative projects for a ﬁrm.
The IRR is deﬁned as such a discount rate that results in the net present
value of the future cash ﬂows generated by the project to be equal to zero.
More formally, if X¯ = {Xt}t=1,...,T are the future cash ﬂows generated by
the project, the Internal Rate of Return
IRR = i∗
is such that the Net Present Value (NPV) at time t = 0 of the investment is
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zero
NPV
(
0, X¯
)
=
T∑
t=0
Xtv (0, t; i
∗) = 0 (2.8)
where v (0, t; i∗) is the discount factor.
Two approaches will be considered to risk-adjust the IRR:
• approach 1: Adjust the cash ﬂow X¯ to consider an initial capital re-
quirement needed to cover uncertanties of the future cash ﬂows, as a
sort of capital strain to be set aside at time 0;
• approach 2: Adjust the cash ﬂow X¯ to consider the notional cost of
capital in the single future cashﬂows.
We'll illustrate the two approaches using an example.
Say that X¯ is such that:
• there is an initial outﬂow X0 = 100;
• which is followed by 20 positive inﬂlows, all of which are equal to
Xt = 10, t = 1, ..., 20.
Then, we'll have that IRR
(
X¯
)
= 7.8%.
Under Approach 1, let's say that, in order to realise the cash ﬂow in the
above example, the ﬁrm is required to put aside a risk capital equal to 50 at
time zero. This capital is than released over the next 20 years by equal parts
of 2.5 at the end of each year. If these capital movements are added to the
correspondent original cash ﬂows, the new cash ﬂow proﬁle is than equal to:
X˜0 = −100− 50 = −150
X˜t = +10 + 2.5 = 12.5, t = 1, ..., 20
which leads to an Economic Internal Rate of Return of EIRR1
(
X¯
)
= 5.5%.
Under Approach 2, let's assume that the market price for capital re-
sources for the type of projects which is considered above is equal to 4%
p.a.; in this case the new adjusted cash ﬂows will be equal to:
X˜0 = −100− 50 · 4% = −102
X˜t = 10− (50− 2.5 · t) · 4%, t = 1, ..., 20
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which results in an Economic Internal Rate of Return of EIRR2
(
X¯
)
= 6%.
The results under the two risk-adjustment approaches are diﬀerent. It
should be noted that both approaches rely on some external measures of
the risk implicitly given in the following three values:
• value of the required capital,
• the capital release time structure, and
• cost of capital rate.
Since the above values are not necessarily inter-consistent, we cannot expect
that in general case the two risk-adjusted IRR measures will be equal.
Remark 2.2 (on the Relationship between EIRR, RoRAC and
RARoC). It is interesting to notice that special case of the two approaches
above are, respectively, the RoRAC (Return on Risk Adjusted Capital) and
the RARoC (Risk Adjusted Return on Capital) measures, where T = 1.
Considering Approach 1, if the initial out-ﬂow is -X˜0 (including a risk ad-
justement) and the in-ﬂow at t = 1 is X1, then, discounting by linear com-
pounding, we have that
−X˜0 + X1
(1 + EIRR1)
= 0
X1 − X˜0 = X˜0 · EIRR1
EIRR1 =
∆X
X˜0
(2.9)
which is the ratio of return over invested risk-adjusted capital.
Considering Approach 2, if the initial outﬂow is -X0 and X1 is the risk-
adjusted inﬂow at t = 1, then, discounting by linear compounding, we have
that
−X0 + X˜1
(1 + EIRR2)
= 0
X˜1 −X0 = X0 · EIRR2
EIRR2 =
∆X˜
X0
(2.10)
which is the ratio of risk-adjusted return over invested capital.
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The following sections focus on each of the three item in an insurance
context: proﬁtability, risk and capital.
2.3 Proﬁtability measures in insurance
Many diﬀerent indicators to assess proﬁtability exist in the insurance market,
the reason for such a diversity being related to factors such as type of business
considered, regulation in force, historical heritage, purpose for which the
assessment is performed.
Given an insurance portfolio, the pace of recognition of proﬁts is one
of the key aspects of ﬁnancial reporting. The speed at which these are
recognised varies signiﬁcantly between diﬀerent ﬁnancial reporting bases,
albeit the ultimate overall proﬁtability is eﬀectively the same. The most
signiﬁcant aspects determining the pace of recognition are as follows:
• the extent to which acquisition expenses can be deferred;
• whether initial charges are required to be deferred;
• whether the present value of future proﬁts can be recognised at incep-
tion.
The speed of recognition on a particular basis also depends on the con-
sidered product. In general, bases giving higher importance to protecting
policyholders (which is often the case in local GAAP) should use more pru-
dent assumptions than those which are more focused on shareholders' value
(e.g. MCEV10).
In general, some of the key elements of proﬁt reporting under diﬀerent
bases (e.g. how provisions are calculated, how quickly proﬁts are recognized)
can be summarised as follows:
• Local GAAP  cash basis: Provisions are calculated using prudent
assumptions; speed of recognition of proﬁt is low due to the progres-
sive release of prudence, however future proﬁts are recognized at the
valuation date;
10Market Consistent Embedded Value, calculated using 17 principles published by the
CFO forum in June 2008. The reporting system is designed to focus on shareholder
interests.
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• IFRS 4 Phase I : Although provisions should follow in principle a fair
value approach (using realistic assumptions), in practice companies
usually adjust Solvency I ﬁgures (for example, to allow for Deferred
Acquisition Costs); speed of recognition of proﬁt is therefore low (as
recognition of future proﬁt is deferred); IFRS 4 Phase II is under di-
scussion and is likely to require a single measurement approach that
will apply to all insurance contracts, switching towards a market con-
sistent approach;
• MCEV / EEV 11: Provisions are calculated using realistic assumptions;
the speed of recognition of proﬁt is high, as the value of future proﬁts is
considered at the valuation date; hence, the value of proﬁt recognised
in projected years is generally lower, compared to other bases;
• Solvency II : Provisions are calculated using realistic assumptions (with
some exceptions); speed of recognition of proﬁt is high; value of future
proﬁts is considered.
The following paragraphs provide an introduction to three of the most widely
used and well known economic proﬁtability measures in the insurance mar-
ket.
MCEV Operating Proﬁt. Proﬁt arising from a given portfolio can be de-
ﬁned as the positive change in the economic value of that portfolio. MCEV is
a good candidate for measuring economic value, as it represents the present
value of shareholders' interests in the earnings distributable from assets al-
located to the covered business after suﬃcient allowance for the aggregate
risks in the covered business, as stated by the CFO forum in [8].
Two approaches for calculating MCEV have been proposed and are used
in practice, as illustrated in Figure 2.2:
• Balance Sheet approach;
• Earnings approach.
11A consistent basis for European Insurers to prepare their Embedded Value Re-
ports, the European Embedded Value follows twelve principles and guidelines that were
launched by the CFO forum in May 2004 and were formally adopted at the end of 2005.
EEV provides explicit allowance for cost of capital and time value of options and guaran-
tees.
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Figure 2.2: The two MCEV approach
Under the Balance Sheet approach, MCEV is seen as the diﬀerence bet-
ween the Market Value of Assets (MVA) and the Market Value of Liabilities
(MVL). The latter is intended as the sum of Frictional Cost of Capital (Fr-
CoC, reﬂecting investment and taxation costs on the assets backing required
capital), Current Estimate of Liability (CEL, which includes the Time Value
of Guarantees, TVoG), Market Value Margin (MVM) and the tax liability.
Under the Earnings approach, MCEV is obtained as the sum of Value
of In Force (VIF), the Required Capital Ct (under local regulations) and
Free Surplus. The VIF is the only part of the Present Value of Future
Proﬁts (PVFP) which is included in MCEV: proﬁts associated to FrCoC,
to the Cost of Residual Non Hedgeable risks (CRNHR) and to the TVoG
are considered part of the MVL. In this (simpliﬁed) view, Shareholders' Net
Worth (SNW) is the sum of Required Capital and Free Surplus.
Analysing the return on embedded value is a useful exercise at least in
order to
• compare actual experience against expectations,
• provide management with the value of new business written in a year,
and
• identify any actions to take future advantage of proﬁtable business
or limit future losses (e.g. unproﬁtable contracts that should be re-
designed or re-priced, as taught in actuarial exams, like UK's [29]).
The Embedded Value Earning (EVE) generated in the (t, t+ 1) time horizon
is deﬁned as MCEV operating proﬁt minus the return gained on employed
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capital Ct:
EV Et,t+1 = OPMCEV,(t,t+1) − rt,t+1Ct (2.11)
where MCEV operating proﬁt is given by:
• the unwind of the risk discount rate r (i.e. the return on the opening
VIF using the risk discount rate), which represents the proﬁt due to
the fact that future cash ﬂows are discounted for one year less;
• minus the expected proﬁt emerging in (t, t+ 1) from in-force business
(expected given assumptions as at t);
• plus the Value of New Business written, which is obtained by discount-
ing future proﬁts expected for new business (i.e. expected revenues less
acquisition expenses), using the risk discount rate;
• plus experience variances, i.e. any movement in the VIF experienced
in (t, t+ 1) arising from diﬀerences between investment assumptions
in t and in t+ 1;
• plus any impact of operating assumptions changes, e.g. in the reserving
bases;
• less development costs in (t, t+ 1);
• plus return on opening SNW expected by shareholders.
In terms of desirable properties, the Embedded Value Earning gives a reali-
stic measure of proﬁt which can be applied consistently to new business and
to in-force business. It can therefore be suitably used for new business pricing
as well as to consider the impact of potential business decisions. As a mea-
sure, it does consider cost of capital required, however the capital considered
does not necessarily provide a realistic measure of the risk of the portfolio.
Other downsides are the potential misalignment with other accounting bases
(reconciling with IFRS is not a trivial exercise, for instance) and the fact
that it has historically been designed for life business rather than for non-life
business.
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Solvency II Operating Proﬁt. Solvency II (S-II) proﬁt is deﬁned as the
change in shareholders' Solvency II Basic Own Funds OF (excluding capital
movements such as dividends). It provides an estimate of the increase in the
value of the business (based on a S-II basis). In terms of properties of this
measure, the assessment is similar to MCEV Operating Proﬁt. Note that
S-II Proﬁt, although being market-consistent and therefore (in principle)
reﬂecting a realistic view of the ﬁrm, is not adjusted according to the level
of risk underlying the portfolio, and it doesn't allow for the ﬁrm's internal
risk appetite.
Free Cash Generation. Free Cash Generation (FCG) is a measure
used to present the business plan of an insurance company to investors and
to make decisions in terms of dividends policy. Its relevance as a proﬁtability
measure is due to at least two basic factors:
1. it is a pure cash (after tax) measure, and allows for changes in re-
gulatory capital requirements (therefore its relevance for the dividends
policy);
2. it is consistent with the accounting basis, and is calculated in a very
similar way as IFRS cash generation.
It can be deﬁned as the Net Proﬁt (after tax, Πt,t+1) after removing any
movement in the Required Capital (Ct) over the considered time horizon
(usually one year):
FCGt,t+1 = Πt,t+1 −∆Ct,t+1 (2.12)
Free Cash Generation is therefore the surplus generated by the insurance
business after allowing for the impact of regulatory capital requirements.
Measuring Free Cash Generation is especially relevant for shareholders,
since the generation of free surplus plays a key role in determining the divi-
dends policy of the ﬁrm. The dividends topic will further be investigated in
Chapter 3.
In terms of desirable properties, the calculation of FCG is quite straight-
forward, transparent and not very time consuming, given that required input
data is generically available. Being a cash measure, it is easily understand-
able and acceptable by Regulators and senior management. Among the
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downsides, however, it is not risk-adjusted (unless regulatory capital is de-
ﬁned as Required Economic Capital, as we shall see in the next section), it's
not an economic measure (no allowance is made for cashﬂows' uncertainty)
and is not suitable for prospective purposes (e.g. new business pricing). The
risk-adjusted version of FCG is Sustainable Free Surplus (FSF), which is
deﬁned in section 2.6.
2.4 Risk measures in insurance
Concepts, deﬁnitions and tools related to risk measures are covered in detail
in [36]. Below we provide a few highlights which will be useful in the rest of
this thesis.
Deﬁnition of risk measure. A risk measure is any functional (mapping)
σ (·) that assigns a monetary amount σ (X) ∈ R to a given probability
distribution of a variable X and increases monotonically with the level of risk
exposure underlying that probability distribution forecast12. The following
list provides a few example of most widely known risk measures:
• Standard deviation, given by
SDc (X) = c ·
√
E (X − E [X]) (2.13)
where the constant c can be expressed in such a way that for some
`representative' X0 (e.g. a loss distribution of an average ﬁrm for the
market) we have that
P (X0 ≥ E [X0] + SDc (X)) ≤ α
for some small α (e.g. α = 0.5%);
• Value at Risk (VaR), given by
V aRα (X) = F
−1 (α) = inf {x ∈ R|Fx (X) ≥ α} (2.14)
i.e. the worst possible outcome (loss) that can occur within a certain
level of probability (1− α). The capital deﬁned as VaR will be suﬃ-
12An exhaustive discussion on risk measures and coherence properties is provided by
McNeil et al. in [36], and a synthesis in [39]
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cient to cover losses that may occur to the ﬁrm with probability(1− α),
however it does not make any consideration of loss events beyond the
(1− α)-quantile of the distribution of outcomes;
• Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE), given by
CTEα (X) = E [X|X ≥ V aRα (X)] (2.15)
i.e. the expected outcome (loss) beyond the (1− α)-quantile;
• Expected shortfall (ES), given by
ESα (X) =
1
1− α
1ˆ
α
V aRu (X) du (2.16)
i.e. the expected loss in the (100 · α)% worst cases.
In this thesis we will focus on the risk measure which is proposed by Solvency
II to calculate ﬁrms' Required Economic Capital in the European Union.
In general, Economic Capital is an internal ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of the
capital required given company's risk appetite and on-going business strat-
egy. It is calculated as the value of assets in excess of liabilities so that,
allowing for (all) the risk factors which the ﬁrm is exposed to, claims can be
met with a high degree of certainty. Economic Capital can be interpreted
as a monetary measure of risk. Required Economic Capital is deﬁned in the
next section.
2.5 Capital measures in insurance
In order to calculate the appropriate performance measure in the form of a
rate-of-return, several non-risk-adjusted quantities can be used.
For instance, assets are widely used by market analysts in ROA (Return
on Assets) measures, and provide an interesting denominator to measure
economic eﬃciency of the business. It is a valid indicator for a management's
point of view, although it is of little use for shareholders and to make business
decisions (for example because allocating assets to speciﬁc lines of business
is not always an easy exercise).
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Another popular denominator used to assess proﬁtability against is sales
(e.g. measured as Present Value of New Business Premiums). Using these as
a denominator might be preferable, for example, when the standpoint is that
of Regulators, if the objective is to assess policy rates oﬀered by an insurer
to the market (see [35]).
In the next subsections we will hint at other potential candidates such as
• Equity capital;
• Available Economic Capital (AEC).
Then, we will conclude that if we want to assess the Risk-Adjusted per-
formance of a considered investment/LoB, then a ratio having some risk
measure (e.g. allocated economic capital) as the denominator should be
used.
2.5.1 Equity capital
Equity is usually a preferable measure when the company's-wide ﬁnancial
performance is concerned from a shareholders' point of view. It can be de-
ﬁned on an accounting basis as the balancing item between the value of
assets and the value of liabilities13. Although being a widely used denom-
inator for deﬁning the performance of a ﬁrm from the shareholders' point
of view, its downsides in the RAPM context is that Equity does not allow
for risk, and it is not easily allocated across the diﬀerent components of the
business (e.g. products, functions, risk factors etc.). In chapter 4 we also in-
vestigate the signiﬁcant problems which deﬁning the strategy of a ﬁrm based
an equity-based metric such as Return on Equity can lead to.
2.5.2 Solvency II-consistent Economic Capital
Two concepts are key to set up an Economic Capital framework in insurance:
13When deﬁning equity in this way, one should be careful as potentially an issue with
goodwill recognition may arise. Namely, if the company is quoted, the goodwill, which is
the diﬀerence between the market value of the company (driven by its share price) and its
net assets value, is likely to be reﬂected in the balance sheet as an asset. This means that
the balance sheet's equity is consistent with the market's equity. However, if the company
is not quoted, there is no explicit market value of the company, and its goodwill may be
not adequately reﬂected in the balance sheet. In this case the balance sheet's equity is
just a rough indication of the shareholder's value of the company, and this can be far from
the company's true market value.
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• Available Economic Capital, as the amount of capital a ﬁrm holds by
valuing its assets and liabilities on a realistic bases;
• Required Economic Capital, as the amount of capital a ﬁrm should
hold in order to cover the risks connected to its proﬁle and businesss
model.
The economic balance sheet of a ﬁrm is composed of 5 main items:
• invested assets (A0): in a Solvency II framework, these are valued on
a marked-to-market basis
at the amount for which they could be exchanged between
knowledgeable willing parties in an arm's length transaction[43];
• insurance technical provision (TP0): in general, this item reﬂects the
value of future obligations to policyholders. In a Solvency II frame-
work, technical provisions are valued as current exit value, i.e.
it should correspond to the amount an insurance or reinsu-
rance undertaking would have to pay if it transferred its contrac-
tual rights and obligations immediately to another undertaking[43]
Insurance liabilities are assessed following 2 methods:
• as a whole, if their value is directly observable in the market;
• as the sum of the Best Estimate (BEL0) of the present value
of the net cash ﬂows arising from the insurance contracts
plus a risk margin (RMt), i.e. the additional amount to be
added to the BEL to ensure that a third party would willing
to inherit the liabilities, calculated as a function of the cost
for the ﬁrm to hold the required capital for unheadeable
risks related to that liability until run oﬀ;
• other balance sheet items (O0): these include Other liabilities (e.g.
staﬀ pension schemes and subordinated debt, usually valued according
to a mark-to-model approach), Other assets (e.g. Ceded reinsurance
liabilities, valued consistently with Gross liabilities) and Net deferred
taxes;
2.5 Capital measures in insurance 31
• Available Economic Capital (AEC0): this is deﬁned as the available
capital at time 0. In a traditional world, this is generically calculated
as (A0 − TP0 −O0), thus it coincides with the market capitalization
of the ﬁrm (i.e. its equity, if it is not a mutual insurer). The Sol-
vency II regulation distinguishes between Basic, Available and Eligible
Own Funds (where only Eligible Own Funds can be used to cover the
required capital and depends on tiering limits). For the sake of this
thesis, these three amounts are set to be equal and corresponding to
the Available Economic Capital. Being the net asset value, this item
can be interpreted as the ﬁnancial enterprise value of the ﬁrm at time
0;
• Required Economic Capital (REC0,α): this is the amount of capital
that the Regulator expects the company to hold. In general, the Re-
gulator requests this to be lower than Available Capital (in Solvency
I words, the Minimum solvency margin MSM0 must be lower than
the ﬁrm's equity). In a risk-adjusted regime, a well known deﬁnition of
this is VaR-based (i.e. based on a Value at Risk measure), and thought
of as the smallest amount of available capital at time 0 that satisﬁes
the condition that the amount of Own Funds at time 1 (as seen at t =
0) is positive with a probability of α, i.e.
REC0,α = argminx {P (OF1 ≥ 0|OF0 = x) ≥ α} . (2.17)
The probability α is a parameter deﬁned by the subject who requires
economic capital. If the subject is the Board, then α denotes the Risk
Appetite of the ﬁrm. Note that the Solvency Capital Requirement
(SCR) deﬁned in the Solvency II regime can be thought of as the Re-
quired Economic Capital where the conﬁdence level α is set to 99.5%.
This is an implicit deﬁnition of the SCR ensuring that if the Own
Funds at t = 0 are greater or equal to the Solvency Capital Require-
ment, then the probability that the Own Funds at t = 1 is positive is
at least 99.5%;
• S-II Surplus (S0): The diﬀerence between Available Economic Capital
and the Required Economic Capital represents the ﬁrm's Surplus. This
is the maximum amount that can be distributed back to shareholders.
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Both Available and Required Economic Capital can be used as the capital
metric to serve as a denominator of a performance measure, as both provide
an economic, realistic view of performance, both can be consistently deﬁned
at various granularity level (so called capital allocation, although this is
not always straightforward to do, as we discuss in sub-section 2.5.4) and can
be used for both prospective and retrospective analyses.
Remark 2.3 (on Required Economic Capital) A clariﬁcation on the
concept of required. Required Economic Capital is usually referred to as
a sort of internal view of the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR), in case
any calculation assumption or rule diﬀers from what is prescribed by the
Regulator. In this thesis, Required Economic Capital is the Available Eco-
nomic Capital that the Board asks the Top Management to hold in order to
be consistent with their risk appetite.
Note that in Solvency II, ﬁrms which use an internal model to calculate the
SCR are required to be able to produce the so called Probability Distribution
Forecast, i.e. a function which assigns probabilities to changes in the amount
of basic own funds over 1 year time horizon. In these cases, ﬁrms have to
be able to calculate the Value at Risk corresponding to a diﬀerent percentile
than the Solvency II-prescribed 99.5%.
For instance, internal model ﬁrms must be able to calculate the 99.9%-ile
of the distribution of ∆AEC, which is the amount of capital they should
hold in order to be able to successfully cope with a 1 in 1000 shock. In
other words, if the ﬁrm's risk appetite is 0.1%, then holding an amount of
AEC equal to the SCR would not be enough to fulﬁl shareholder's appetite,
but its Required Economic Capital will correspond to the 99.9%-ile of the
distribution of AEC.
2.5.3 Concepts and challenges in calculating, aggregating
and allocating required economic capital
Three ways for calculating required economic capital for insurers have been
proposed and employed in the industry in the past few years:
• stress-based approaches;
• nested stochastic approaches;
• Monte Carlo with Proxy functions approaches.
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In this subsection we will provide a high level overview of the three ap-
proaches. Then, in the following subsection, we will illustrate two explicative
applications of Monte Carlo with Proxy functions approaches.
Stress-based approach. This approach involves 5 steps:
1. risk mapping, which means identifying the m risk factors {Xi}i=1,...,m
which the ﬁrm's available capital depends on, so that
AECt = f
(
t, {Xi}i=1,...,m
)
;
2. stress calibration, i.e. calibrate the desired stress on each of the m risk
factors, {X∗i }i=1,...,m ;
3. individual capital assessment, i.e. the impact on Available Economic
Capital of each of the m stresses calibrated in step 2
ICAi = ∆AECt,i = − [f (t+∆t, X∗i )− f (t,Xi)] ;
4. capital aggregation, i.e. calculating the (standalone) Required Eco-
nomic Capital RECk for any desired level of granularity (where k may
represent a given legal entity, region or the whole Group) from the
single ICAs (so called modular approach) by using correlation matri-
ces (this is why stress-based approaches are also often referred to as
Variance-Covariance approaches);
5. capital allocation, which consists in allocating (means subdividing)
required economic capital to a higher granularity level than REC is
calculated at. In other words, diversication beneﬁt should be allocated
across the ﬁrm's various constituent (e.g. each single business unit,
line of business, etc.); capital allocation will be further discussed in
subsection 2.5.4.
Example of stress based approaches are:
• UK's Internal Capital Assessment (also known as Solvency I Pillar 2),
which provides a realistic, internal, risk-based view on required capital;
• Solvency II Standard Formula with market-wide parameters, provided
to european ﬁrms to calculate their SCR, where step 2 is provided by
2.5 Capital measures in insurance 34
the Regulator (through standard stresses calibrated on market data)
and step 3 is performed using a ﬁxed formula (in general, market-wide
parameters are multiplied times a ﬁrm's speciﬁc volume measure);
• Solvency II Standard Formula with undertaking-speciﬁc parameters,
which is a variant of the Solvency II Standard Formula mentioned
above, where the Regulator allows the ﬁrm to replace a subset of
market-wide parameters with parameters calibrated on ﬁrm's data.
There are at least three drawback about this approach:
• the key output is the single REC, it doesn't produce the full distri-
bution of potential losses (the so-called PDF, Probability Distribution
Forecast);
• it implicitly assumes losses come from multivariate normal distribution,
thus including a constant degree of dependency between risk at all
degrees of severity (so that tail dependency cannot be captured);
• futhermore, it assumes losses are linearly dependent on risk factors,
however this is often not the case, e.g. for portoﬂios of participating
policies with guarantees, if two risks such as equity and interest rates
are stressed together, the impact might well exceed the sum of the
single risks.
Nested-stochastic approach. This is considered to be the purest ap-
proach, and involves the following steps:
1. risk mapping and calibration, which involves identifying the risk factors
of the ﬁrm (similarly to the stress-based approach) and studying their
dynamics;
2. real world simulation, i.e. simulate large set of S one-year scenarios of
the drivers identiﬁed in the previous step, i.e.{Xi,s}i=1,...,m; s=1,...,S ;
3. balance sheet simulation, i.e. re-value the individual components of the
balance sheet for each scenario; for many assets and liabilities this has
to be done by performing a risk neutral projection to capture all risk
characteristics (e.g. for complex derivatives and for life products with
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the Nested stochastic approach
embedded guarantees); the impact on Available Economic Capital of
each of the m stresses calibrated in step 2
∆AECt,i = − [f (t+∆t, X1,s, ..., Xm,s)− f (t,X1, ..., Xm)] (2.18)
with i = 1, ...,m; s = 1, ..., S;
4. capital calculation, i.e. calculating the (standalone) Required Eco-
nomic Capital RECk for any desired level of granularity (where k may
represent a given legal entity, region or the whole Group); unlike the
stress-based approach, this is done by converting the distribution of
losses ∆AECt,i,k (the PDF) into a monetary amount, using a pre-
deﬁned risk measure; steps 2-4 are illustrated in Figure 2.3;
5. capital allocation, similarly to the stress-based approach, although the
fact of having the full PDF (rather than the REC only) make more
advanced CAM feasible than in the stress-based approach; an example
of this is provided in subsection 2.5.4.
As discussed by Bauer et Al. in [4], the key challenge with this approach
is in step 3, where a full market-consistent balance sheet must be simulated
for each real world scenario. This involves, especially for portfolio having
life policies with guarantees, to make N risk neutral projections until year
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T (to project cash ﬂows arising from each contract) for each of the S 1-year
real world scenarios generated, yielding to a nested stochastic simulation
which for ﬁrms having thousands (or millions) of policies can be prohibitive
from a computational perspective. This is even more true considering that
REC calculations need to be performed on a timely level and in line with
business needs in terms of decision making processes.
Monte Carlo simulation with proxy functions. This approach stands
someway in the middle between the Nested-stochastic and the Stress-based
approach in terms of accuracy and computational eﬀort; it involves the fol-
lowing steps:
1. risk mapping and calibration, similarly to the nested stochastic ap-
proach, which leads to the calibration of a joint probability distribu-
tion of all the identiﬁed risk factors (this also involves calibrating their
dependency structure);
2. proxy function calibration, aiming to describe the value of the balance
sheet item as a function of all risk factors that are shocked in the real
world simulation;
3. real world simulation, i.e. simulate large set of S one-year scenarios
of the risk factors consistently with the distributions and dependency
structure calibrated in step 1; a numerical example of how to do this
is provided in subsection 3.2.3.1;
4. balance sheet simulation, i.e. re-value the individual components of the
balance sheet for each scenario based on the calibrated proxy functions;
the formula for this is the same as 2.18, however here the proxy func-
tions f (t,X1, ..., Xm) have been calibrated in step 2 and don't require
any further risk neutral simulation;
5. capital calculation, similarly to the nested stochastic approach; steps
2-5 are illustrated in Figure 2.4;
6. capital allocation, similarly to the nested stochastic approach.
The key challenges of this approach are summarised in at least two ques-
tions: how to calibrate the right proxy function to reﬂect the dynamics of
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of the Monte Carlo simulation with proxy functions
approach
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AEC as a function of the mapped risk factors? What degree of inaccuracy
is considered acceptable for a proxy?
A number of solutions have been proposed in order to perform step 2
above, the most widely known in the industry are:
• Curve ﬁtting, which has widely been used since 2009 in the UK mar-
ket by such players as Aviva, Prudential and Standard Life (see, for
instance, Kousaris in [33]), which consists in (1) select a range of stand-
alone and combined real world stresses across all Financial, Credit and
Underwriting risk factors, (2) calculate the impact on AEC under each
stressed scenario (using, where necessary, risk neutral simulations),
and (3) ﬁtting a polynomial formula expressing AEC as a function
of the risk factors (e.g. using Ordinary Least Squares methodology).
The quality of the ﬁtted proxy functions for multi-risk stress scenar-
ios depends on the quality of the scenarios chosen to ﬁt the so-called
cross-terms of the function (i.e. reﬂecting any non-linearity in the joint
impact of stresses of two risks on AEC) and hence on the quality of
expert judgment involved in the process;
• Least Square Monte Carlo, which has recently been implemented by
Generali and was ﬁrstly introduced in the scientiﬁc debate by Bauer
et Al. in [4]; this approach consists in (1) generating a large set (e.g.
25,000) of multi-risk real world stresses which are generated using a
stochastic engine (as opposed to expert judgment which is used in
the curve ﬁtting approach), (2) calculating the corresponding stressed
value of liabilities (by generating a small number of corresponding risk
neutral scenarios, e.g. 2), (3) ﬁtting a multi-variate polynomial as a
proxy BEL through a Least-Squares regression. Then, like in the
curve ﬁtting approach, we have calibrated (proxy) BEL as the de-
pending variable and the risk factor realizations as the independent
variables;
• Replicating portfolios, which allows to assess the ﬁnancial risks which
a life insurance Company is exposed to by identifying a portfolio of
assets, in a way that its price is consistent to the market value of in-
surance obligations; from an operational point of view, the portfolio
replication allows to transform the liability object into an asset ob-
ject (change of metrics), which is possible because, especially for life
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participating business, insurance contracts often provide similar char-
acteristics ﬁnancial contracts, especially in terms of market risk proﬁle
(this being the reason for this approach to be widely used in Europe
by such players as Axa and Allianz for market and credit risks)[19].
Although all these approaches manage to relax many of the limitations of
stress-based approaches (e.g., the fact that losses are not necessarily linearly
dependent on risk factors), a number of attention points must be dealt with
carefully, namely:
• choice of the regression function, which is largely arbitrary, especially
in the curve ﬁtting case, where the ability of the curve to replicate
the behaviour of AEC depends on the stresses on which the ﬁtting is
performed, which is especially concerning given that REC calculation
is particularly interested in extreme scenarios;
• unsuitability of the approach to accurately reﬂect the behaviour of
AEC vs. non-ﬁnancial risks, which is particularly relevant for the repli-
cating portfolios approach;
• simulation error and choice of the number of ﬁtting scenarios, both in
terms of real world and risk neutral simulation, in order to calibrate
the proxy function (i.e. convergence testing);
• proxy acceptance criteria, thus involving carefully deﬁning materiality
thresholds in order to establish when a proxy is good enough (be it
a curve or a replicating portfolio of assets).
If these limitations are carefully managed, then such proxy models can be
deemed to be a valid solution for insurers to calculate the full PDF of their
AEC in a computationally feasible fashion. The next subsection shows one
of the key advantages of having the full PDF, from a capital management
perspective.
2.5.4 Capital allocation and risk appetite: a conditional tail
expectation approach
Once calculated and aggregated, capital may need to be allocated (means
subdivided) across the ﬁrm's various constituents (e.g. business units).
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From a ﬁnancial point of view, the problem of capital allocation is not triv-
ial. This is because if one calculates the standalone risk capital of each
constituent, the sum of such capital is usually larger than the capital of the
ﬁrm taken as a whole, which leads to the notion of diversiﬁcation beneﬁt
achieved by pooling together the ﬁrm's diﬀerent activities.
Allocation of the total capital to the ﬁrm's constituents is then equiva-
lent to allocating the total diversiﬁcation beneﬁt to them. In a sense, the
allocated capital, which is equal to the risk capital of a constituent, mi-
nus its allocated share of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt, can be considered as a
ﬁrm-internal risk measure.
The possible purposes of doing the capital allocation exercise might be
as follows:
• redistributing of the capital-holding costs (frictional and opportunity)
and transferring them back to policyholders;
• regulatory compliance and ﬁnancial reporting;
• comparison and performance evaluation, in particular:
 calculate Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (RAPM) and Re-
turn on Risk-Adjusted Capital (RoRAC);
 identify areas of risk consumption within the ﬁrm;
 inform the remuneration policy in line with business line manage-
ment (division of a bonus pool);
 translate the ﬁrm's performance results into results of competitors
and other industries;
• support to decision making in investment and product proposition
(optimizing the capital usage), business expansions, reduction or eli-
mination, and pricing in merger and acquisition activities.
Depending on the purpose of the analysis, ﬁrms may allocate capital to:
1. ﬁrm's legal (sub-)entities (e.g. subsidiaries or business units);
2. geographies of operation (e.g. diﬀerent districts, countries or regions);
3. operational functions (e.g. sales, underwriting, investment, back of-
ﬁce);
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4. risk drivers (e.g. insurance, market, credit, operational risks; or with
more granularity: mortality, longevity, expenses, equity, interest rate
etc.);
5. lines of business or products (e.g. life, non-life, health; with proﬁts,
non-participating, unit linked; term assurance, endowment, annuities,
critical illness, long term care etc.)
Remark 2.4 (on Capital Allocation Methods) A capital allocation
method (CAM) is any rule, by which the ﬁrm will subdivide its aggregated
REC to its business units {BUi}, assigning to each subsidiary an allocated
capital ECi, such that
ECi = fi (
....
X ,σ) (2.19)
where
....
X represents the whole multivariate distribution of losses for all the
n business units and σ is the risk measure used to calculate the overall REC.
A number of desired properties for CAMs have been suggested, e.g. by
Denault [18] (`No undercut', `Symmetry', `Riskless allocation' and `Non-
negativity') and [10], summarized as:
• Adding-up property, i.e. the sum of allocated capitals should be equal
to the total aggregated capital of the ﬁrm, as in this case diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt is fully distributed between the BUs;
• Equal Treatment Property, i.e. BUs with the same risk characteristics
and the same dependency relationships with the other units should be
allocated an equal amount of capital;
• Strong Monotonicity property, i.e. if the risk characteristic of one BU
is not increasing, then its allocated capital should not increase either;
• Core Compatibility property, i.e. any subgroup of BUs should be al-
located an amount of capital which is not greater than the standalone
capital of this subgroup (otherwise it would have an incentive to leave
the Group).
Many allocation techniques have been proposed, including the simple pro-
portional method, quantile methods [20], discrete marginal methods, Euler
allocation (also called continuous marginal contribution, also discussed in
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Scenario Risk factors BUA BUB Group
# X1 ... Xm AECAs L
A
s AEC
A
s L
A
s AEC
G
s L
G
s
1 X1,1 ... Xm,1 fA (X1,1, ..., Xm,1) −∆AECA1 fB (...) ... fG (...) −∆AECG1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
S X1,S ... Xm,S fA
(
X1,S , ..., Xm,S
) −∆AECAS fB (...) ... fG (...) −∆AECGS
Table 2.3: Generic set of S simulated losses at Group and single BU level
[36]), Covariance methods, Conditional Tail Expectation [48], Nucleolus [44]
and Shapley [46].
In the next paragraph we provide an illustrative example of how the
continuous marginal contribution approach can be implemented if we have
the full PDF of AEC, to show how this can be linked with reverse stress
testing and to the risk appetite framework from a strategic angle.
Continuous Marginal Contribution allocation approach Say that
we follow a Monte Carlo with proxy functions approach to calculate REC of
an insurer having 2 business units, BUA and BUB. We are going to follow
the 6-steps calculation process suggested for a Monte Carlo simulation with
proxy functions described in the previous subsection.
As illustrated in Table 2.3, a set of S real world scenarios given by the
realization of m risk factors (X1,s, ..., Xm,s)s=1,...,S , generated through steps
1 and 3 above; for each of the scenarios, we calculate the value of AEC for
each of the BU and for the Group, and therefore we simulate losses (deﬁned
as negative changes in AEC), by using proxy functions calibrated in step 2
above.
Hence, at the end of step 4, the output we get is represented in Table
2.314.
In this way we are able to calculate standalone REC for Group and for
the two BUs (i.e. for each node of the Group hierarchy) as the 99.5%-ile of
the distributions of losses, consistently with deﬁnition 2.17. We are now able
to apply an Euler approach in the form of continuous marginal contribution
in order to calculate the diversiﬁed capital of the two BUs, i.e. in order to
allocate the Group capital to the single BUs.
The idea is to calculate what is the loss for the single BU which leads to
a Group loss corresponding to the REC. In other words, for BUA, we would
14Where ∆AECAi =
(
AECAi −AECA0
)
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have:
ECA = E
[−∆AECA| −∆AECG = RECG] (2.20)
It has been shown in the academic literature that the conditional tail expec-
tation approach is equivalent to the Euler allocation approach (under certain
circumstances described by Tasche in [49]).
Remark 2.5 (on Critical Scenarios).
Note that it is possible to identify the exact scenario s∗ = (X1,s∗ , ..., Xm,s∗)
which yields to a Group loss corresponding to the Group REC, so that LGs∗ =
−∆AECGs∗ = RECG. Such scenario s∗ is sometimes referred to as the Group
critical scenario, or killer scenario.
Hence, considering this speciﬁc scenario, it would be possible to identify
exactly the contribution of BUA and BUB to that speciﬁc loss, so that a way
to allocate capital (and calculate the so-called unsmoothed diversiﬁed
capital) would be to set
ECunsmA = L
A
s∗ , where s
∗ ∴ LGs∗ = RECG (2.21)
However, unsmoothed diversiﬁed REC is a very volatile measure, as the
unsmoothed diversiﬁed capital for BU A, ECunsmA , could be completely dif-
ferent if we took the 99.501%-ile of the Group losses instead of the 99.500%-ile.
Although the two critical scenarios will have very similar Group losses, those
losses could be for very diﬀerent reasons. One scenario could have included
a large catastrophe risk event aﬀecting BUB only, while the other could have
been dominated by equity losses in the portfolio of BUA.
Therefore, in order to avoid distortions due to simulation error, the distri-
bution of conditional losses needs to be smoothed, using smoothing weights
in order to calculate diversiﬁed economic capital.
Smoothed diversiﬁed economic capital for BUA is given by
ECsmA|G =
S∑
s=1
ws|G · LAs (2.22)
where ws|G is the smoothing weight assigned to scenario s, and LAs is the
loss for BUA in scenario s. Clearly, scenarios yielding to Group losses closer
to the loss corresponding to the critical scenario s∗ will have higher weights
ws|G then other scenarios; for instance, if Group is making a proﬁt in a
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certain scenario s′, then its smoothing weight ws′|G is likely to be very close
to zero.
Several smoothing techniques have been proposed, however the key dif-
ference among them is the statistical distribution used to deﬁne smoothing
weights, e.g. the Harrel Davis (which uses a Beta distribution) and the Gaus-
sian (which is based on a normal distribution) are among the mostly used
smoothing techniques, as described by Harrell and Davis in [27]. The choice
among smoothing techniques is closely linked to the convergence testing of
PDF of AEC to a stable REC.
The conditional tail expectation capital allocation approach have many
upsides, including the possibility of:
• directly linking REC allocation to actual real world scenarios, so that
allocated capital among diﬀerent BUs is extremely consistent;
• performing reverse stress testing exercises, thus understanding what
sort of scenarios constitutes a breaking point for a given BU and,
therefore, better identifying mitigating actions;
• linking allocation of capital with risk appetite, given that REC is al-
located following a percentile approach which is directly derived by
the risk appetite set by the Board (i.e. the choice of α mentioned in
subsection 2.5.2).
The approach described above provides a way to make risk measurement,
capital allocation, reverse stress testing and risk appetite (including the re-
lated escalation procedures, mitigating actions and contingency plans) all
consistent in a unique framework.
2.6 A single measure for proﬁtability, risk and ca-
pital
The objective of a Risk Adjusted Performance Measure (RAPM) is to provide
a uniform measure of performance that management can use to compare
economic proﬁtability of businesses with diﬀerent sources of risk and diﬀerent
capital requirements. As discussed in 2.2.2, the generic representation of
RAPM in insurance may have the form of Return on Risk Adjusted Capital
(RoRAC, see 2.6) or of Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RARoC, see 2.7).
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The following two paragraphs discuss how return and capital can be
risk-adjusted, using some of the concepts introduced in the sections above.
Then, we introduce the metric of Sustainable Free Surplus to show how it
can be used to deﬁne a dividends policy which considers proﬁtability, risk
and capital in a unique holistic view.
Risk Adjusted Return. In performance measurement, the actual earn-
ings are compared against expected (or required) earnings over the mea-
surement period. Economic Value Added is a measure of this comparison,
depends on the cost of capital for the considered ﬁnancial institution and
can be deﬁned as
EV At,t+1 = ActualEarnings−Opportunity cost ·Allocated capital (2.23)
which, by deﬁning Πt,t+1 as the net proﬁt of the ﬁrm generated between t
and t+1, can be expressed as
EV At,t+1 = Πt,t+1 − CoC · ECt (2.24)
or, in an MCEV framework (by using the 2.11) can be rewritten as
EV At,t+1 = OPMCEV,[t.t+1]−CoC ·ECt = EV Et,t+1−ECt · (CoC − rt,t+1)
(2.25)
where ECt ·(CoC − rt,t+1) is the diﬀerence between the target and the actual
return on employed capital and can be interpreted as the extra return on
capital over the cost of capital.
If EVA is greater than zero, then the business is generating value for
investors. The assessment of EVA as a measure depends on the way earnings,
opportunity cost and allocated capital are deﬁned, especially in terms of
eﬃciency, communicability, auditability and consistency. Examples are in
the market where EVA is already used for retrospective applications (e.g.
evaluating the historical performance of a business unit) and for prospective
applications. Furthermore, it deﬁnitely is an economic (i.e. risk-adjusted)
measure.
Hence, Economic Value Added can be used as the numerator of a RARoC
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measure, i.e. the 2.7 becomes:
RARoC =
EV At,t+1
Ct
It is also possible to express RoRAC as a function of EVA by using the 2.24,
so that the 2.6 becomes:
RoRAC =
Πt,t+1
ECt
=
EV At,t+1 + CoC · ECt
ECt
=
EV At,t+1
ECt
+ CoC (2.26)
i.e. RoRAC is the ratio of EVA over allocated capital plus the target cost of
capital rate.
From the 2.26, we can also infer that (by using the 2.25) that RoRAC
is the sum of the ratio of Embedded Value Earning (only related to insu-
rance in-force and new business portfolios) and actual investment return on
Shareholder Net Worth
RoRAC =
EV Et,t+1 − ECt · (CoC − rt,t+1)
ECt
+ CoC =
EV Et,t+1
ECt
+ rt,t+1
(2.27)
Risk Adjusted Capital. In the previous subsection, we investigated how
to deﬁne, calculate and allocate Required Economic Capital. If Required
means required by the Regulator then REC equals to the Solvency Capital
Requirement. In general, however, the amount of capital which the ﬁrm
should hold depends on the risk appetite of shareholders, deﬁned by the
Board.
Many ways are used in the market to deﬁne the Risk Adjusted Capital,
e.g.:
• as a multiple of the regulatory-driven SCR;
• as the amount of AEC that would allow the ﬁrm to hold a given rating,
e.g. AA;
• as the VaR of the Probability Distribution Forecast of AEC with α >
99.5%;
• as an alternative risk measure of the PDF of AEC (e.g. Conditional
Tail Expectation).
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If the capital management policy of the ﬁrm is such that available capital is
allocated to each business unit consistently with the risk appetite framework,
then we will have that:
• any surplus over the REC is distributed to shareholders at t+1 as
dividends, and
• allocated capital for each BU will be equal to their diversiﬁed REC
(see the 2.22).
However, note that, given that regulatory-driven SCR will always be lower
than the risk-appetite-driven REC, in practice ﬁrms will not distribute all
the dividends to shareholders; in other words, the dividends policy and the
risk-appetite framework will always be such that Solvency II excess capital
is well above zero, i.e.
XCt = AECt − SCRt > 0, ∀t = 0, ..., T (2.28)
Sustainable Free Surplus as the driver to deﬁne dividends. The
ultimate synthesis of the three views is provided by the Sustainable Free Sur-
plus generated over a year, i.e. the positive change in St = AECt − RECt
observed between t and t + 1. This is the key metric ﬁrms are increasingly
looking at when setting up their strategy, monitoring their results and re-
munerating management and shareholders.
Just as an example, let's consider shareholders' remuneration: this is
traditionally done through designing a dividends policy which is consistent
with the proﬁts expected to be made over the time horizon of the business
plan.
In a risk-adjusted framework as the one we described so far (i.e. the
Solvency II regime recently come into force in Europe), the dividends policy
must be designed not only considering future proﬁtability of the ﬁrm, but also
(1) the solvency proﬁle of the company (including the quality and structure
of its available capital) and (2) the amount of risk shareholders are eager to
take on (i.e. their risk appetite).
The increasing use (and the subsequent disclosure) of risk adjusted per-
formance measures (as publicly stated by many insurers to the investors
community15) is expected to16
15See, for intance, Zurich 2015 presentation [54]
16Care should be taken when interpreting this Sustainable Free Surplus generated, as
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1. lead to a more realistic and accurate view of ﬁrms' proﬁles,
2. enable an optimized way to manage the business, and
3. ultimately end up in more transparent information available to the
market.
All these aspects will be discussed in the present thesis. The purpose of the
next chapter is to investigate how dividends are aﬀected if a company moves
from a traditional to a risk-based framework. The implication of such move
from a managerial perspective are then discussed in Chapter 4.
this is not immediately convertible into dividends; this is because a large element of
the available economic capial is value of in-force, and therefore cannot be immediately
distributed (as is composed of future proﬁt emerging from the in-force portfolio).
Chapter 3
Moving towards a risk-based
corporate ﬁnance: more
volatile dividends
In this chapter we discuss on how moving from a traditional to a risk-based
proﬁtability model aﬀects dividends.
In order to do so, we specify a model to deﬁne the dividend policy in a
market consistent and risk-adjusted framework, according to the following 3
steps:
1. deﬁne a traditional approach to project proﬁtability and dividends (sec-
tion 3.1);
2. extend the approach to make it market consistent and risk-adjusted
(section 3.2);
3. run the model and analyze results (section 3.3).
The results of the model are followed by a few considerations on the recent
rebate around market-consistent valuations (section 3.4).
In this chapter, we are going to focus on a Non-life insurance case, more
speciﬁcally, an insurance ﬁrm which mostly writes (heavy-tailed) CAT risk.
This is driven by the further level of complexity that the ﬁnancial guarantees
embedded in many Life products would introduce. The discussion on how
Life business is managed and on the impact of the risk-adjusted framework
on dividends for a composite group will be the focus of the chapter 4.
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3.1 A traditional approach to project dividends
To illustrate the dynamics driving the proﬁtability of Non-life insurer we will
use the framework suggested by Dacorogna et Al. in [11].
Three rules and an assumption deﬁne the ﬁrm's capital management
policy (which are consistent with IFRS rules):
Rule_i: annual losses are covered by annual written premiums and, if not
suﬃcient, by equity capital;
Rule_ii: if available capital AECt goes below the initial level of equity
capital C0, the company must raise capital at a cost of capital
CoC (cost of raising capital);
Rule_iii: if the whole available capital is not suﬃcient to settle the annual
claims, the company is bankrupt and can no longer write new
business;
Assumption_i: there is no time diversiﬁcation, hence all the proﬁt generated
in any given year is taxed and then distributed to policyholders
(this hypothesis will be relaxed in the next chapter).
In order to deﬁne how the ﬁrm generates proﬁts for shareholders we will
follow a top down approach, i.e. will start from the end (the wealth of
shareholders) to deep dive into the basics of insurance business (premiums
and claims).
The wealth of shareholders is directly derived from the capital manage-
ment policy above: at time t+1 it derives from the capitalization of their
previous wealth plus dividends δt,t+1 paid out minus any capital injected
between t and t+1, Nt,t+1. Hence, it will be given by the following formula:
Wt+1 = [(1 + rt,t+1)Wt + δt,t+1 −Nt,t+1] · I[no bankruptcy,t,t+1] (3.1)
where:
• rt,t+1 is equal to the risk free rate, as it is assumed that the invest-
ment universe consists of two options to invest money, i.e. in risk-free
investments or in the risky CAT-company;
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• Nt,t+1 = max {0;C0 −ACt+1};
• I[no bankruptcy,t,t+1] is the indicator function for the event of no bankruptcy
between t and t+1, as deﬁned in 3.4;
• W0 = 0;
• the maximum level of dividends that can be distributed is equal to
operating proﬁt (net of tax) after a reduction due to the need to top-up
capital to the original equity capital (and after an increase due to
any surplus carried forward by previous year, in case Assumption_i is
relaxed):
δmaxt,t,+1 = Πt,t+1 − [C0 −AECt+1] (3.2)
Net operating proﬁt is given by operating proﬁt minus the cost of the capital
(if any) that has been injected between t and t+1:
Πt,t+1 = (OPt,t+1 −Nt · CoC) · (1− τ) (3.3)
where:
• τ is the tax rate;
• CoC is the cost of capital, i.e. the return required by shareholders to
be willing to invest 1 in the ﬁrm;
• the (pre-tax) operating proﬁt OPt,t+1 is a function of the technical re-
sult and of the capitalization of invested capital and earned premiums.
If operating proﬁt is actually a loss that makes the available capital become
lower than equity capital, then the ﬁrm must raise capital in order to re-build
enough available capital to restore shareholders' value; if, however, the loss
is such that the full available capital is not enough to cover it, than, given
Rule_iii, the company is bankrupt. In other words, we have the following:
OPt,t+1 = TRt,t+1+rt,t+1 (Ct + Pt)

< −AECt, bankrupt
∈ [−AECt, 0] , necessary to raiseNt at costCoC
> 0, surplus used to rebuild capital
(3.4)
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Finally, technical result is the sum of earned premiums (Pt,t+1) minus
claims' ultimate costs (Yt,t+1) and expenses (Et,t+1):
TRt,t+1 = Pt,t+1 − Yt,t+1 − Et,t+1 (3.5)
While expenses are deﬁned as a combination of a ﬁxed portion of premiums
(e%, given by acquisition and liquidation costs) plus a ﬁxed amount (ad-
ministrative costs), premiums and claims are computed using the following
models.
Remark 3.1 In the paper from Dacorogna et Al. [11], it is implicitly
assumed that all claims are paid as soon as they are reported, and therefore
the ﬁrm is not exposed to reserve risk (otherwise, technical result would also
be driven by the evolution of reserves). We here make the same simplifying
assumption, which holds only in case all claims are assumed to be settled as
soon as they are reported, so that no claims' reserve needs to be eﬀectively
put aside. Consistently, the only source of Non-life underwriting risk we will
deal with in the following subsection is Premium risk (i.e. the risk that the
premiums are not suﬃcient to cover claims and expenses).
Premium model: For the ﬁrst year, we have that premium is equal to
the present value of expected value of claims plus expense loading plus cost
of required capital:
P1 =
E [Y ] · (1 + e%) + CoC · V aR (X, z)
1 + r0,1
. (3.6)
For the following years, the model is adjusted to reﬂect the market cycle
(e.g. if loss ratios have been consistently lower than 100%, then the market
is softening and premiums will tend to go below technical premiums), thus
we have:
Pt = Pt−1 ·

(1− s) , if LRt−1 < LRs (softening)
1, if LRs ≤ LRt−1 ≤ LRh
(1 + h) , if LRt−1 > LRh (hardening)
(3.7)
where:
• LRt−1 is the historically observed ratio of claims over premium for the
previous year (loss ratio at time t− 1);
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• LRs and LRh are two ﬁxed thresholds of below (above) which a soft-
ening (hardening) of the premium by the factor s (h) takes place.
Claims model: Given that the company mostly writes heavy tailed CAT
risks, annual aggregate claims are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution:

Y ∼ LN
(
µ, σ2
)
µ = ln [V aR (Yt, z)]− σ · Φ−1 (z) ; σ =
√
ln
[
1 + CoV (Y )2
] (3.8)
where:
• Φ−1 (z) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal distribution, and
• CoV (Y ) is the coeﬃcient of variation, CoV (Y ) = std(Y )/E(Y ) and re-
ﬂects the underwriting policy.
In the next section we show how this framework can be extended to reﬂect
a risk-adjusted view of the market to build a proﬁtability model based on
Economic Capital.
3.2 Extension to an Economic Capital framework
There are three main limitations to the traditional framework described in
the previous section:
• it does not properly reﬂect market dynamics, assuming that a ﬂat risk
free interest rate is to be applied to premium and capital invested in
the market;
• it does not take into account the change in Required Economic Capital
over one year;
• it assumes no time diversiﬁcation, so that the ﬁrm's top management
has little freedom to manage the dividends ﬂow.
In this section we propose a way to overtake these limitations by introducing
four components:
• a market model to capture the dynamics of the asset portfolio;
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• a dependency structure between CAT Risk and Market risks;
• a simpliﬁed deﬁnition of the Required Economic Capital;
• a dividends' realization strategy.
3.2.1 Modelling the asset portfolio
In order to perform a market consistent valuation of risky portfolios, a model
must be deﬁned to be able to capture the dynamics of all the d relevant
risk factors which may impact the value of the N contracts composing the
portfolio.
Such market models typically assume that investors can trade in a fric-
tionless, continuously open ﬁnancial market where arbitrage opportunities
are made impossible by market players, who are rationale (i.e. proﬁt maxi-
mizers), knowledgeable and price takers. Given that asset modelling is not
the core focus of this work, we will consider a simple portfolio composed by
2 types of contracts:
• interest rate sensitive (e.g. bonds), exposed to interest rate risk;
• stocks, exposed to equity risk.
The Cox, Ingersoll, Ross (CIR) model is an example of model used to capture
interest rate risk in bond portfolios. It is a mean reverting square root able to
capture the dynamic of the spot rate rt keeping consistency over a multiple
years timeframe
drt = fr (r, t) dt+ gr (r, t) dZr,t (3.9)
where the drift is fr (r, t) = α (γ − rt), representing the long term rate of
return, and the diﬀusion factor is gr (r, t) = ρ
√
r.
Key hypotheses of the model are that the spot rate is non-centred-chi-
square-distributed, hence the spot rate is assumed to be non-negative. In
recent times, such assumption has been challenged by the market, given
the prolonged low interest rates enviroment experienced following several
quatitative easing by US' Federal Reserve bank, UK's Bank of England and
EU's European Central Bank, leading to the diﬀusion of models based on
market-observable quantities (e.g. LIBOR forward rates). Such models (e.g.
the LMM or LIBOR Market Model, see [6]) work reasonably well even in
3.2 Extension to an Economic Capital framework 55
stressed market scenarios, however they are inherently exposed to market
manipulation and distortions (see the 2012 LIBOR scandal, manipulated by
Barclays starting from 2005).
Equity risk can modelled using an extension of the Black and Scholes
formula, aimed at modelling changes in stock prices:
dSt = fS (S, t) dt+ gS (S, t) dZS,t (3.10)
where fS (r, t) = µSt and gS (S, t) = σSt.
The B-S model assumes that St is lognormally distributed with param-
eters
(
µ− σ22
)
τ and σ
√
τ , and the risk market price is equal to q (St, t) =
µ−rt
σ .
The correlation between the processes of spot rates and instantaneous
changes to stock prices is modelled using an instantaneous correlation coef-
ﬁcient η = ρrS , so that their covariance is
Cov
[
dZrt ; dZ
S
t
]
= ηdt.
In this market framework (as shown, for example, by De Felice and Mori-
coni in [13]), the asset fund performance A is given by jointly modelling stock
and bond prices, by solving the following diﬀerential equation:
δA
δt
+rS
δA
δS
+
1
2
σ2S2
δ2A
δS2
+[α (γ − r) + pir] δA
δr
+ρrSσSρ
√
r
δ2A
δrδS
+
1
2
ρ2r
δ2A
δr2
= rA
(3.11)
Therefore, based on the instantaneous dynamic above, the portfolio re-
turn will be calculated on an annual basis as r
ptf
t,t+1 =
At+1.t−At
At
.
3.2.2 Modelling the dependency between market and under-
writing risk
In order to aggregate risk a dependency structure must be introduced. The
goal of the exercise is to identify how the factors driving two diﬀerent risk
categories move together. For instance, in the Life insurance business, if
interest rates go signiﬁcantly up then most likely policyholders will tend to
exit their old contracts (especially if these have ﬁxed yield which aren't linked
to market rates) to invest their money in securities oﬀering more favourable
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terms; in this case we observe a positive correlation between interest rate
risk and lapse risk.
Given that insurers aim to achieve a holistic view on their risk pro-
ﬁle, which consider all the risks they are exposed to (and are, by the way,
explicitly requested to do so by the Regulator1), then an analysis on the
dependency structure must be performed.
In the Non-life example discussed above, the need arises to investigate
the dependency between underwriting and market risks. In this context,
underwriting risk is assumed to arise from catastrophe risk, i.e. the risk
of losses/ adverse changes in the value of liabilities arising from extreme
Non-life events in a one-year time horizon.
Before starting a quantitative correlation analysis, the process of inves-
tigating the dependency structure between a pair of risks usually involves
a qualitative assessment aimed at better grasping the suble connection that
might exist between the two risks. This can be done by discussing the fol-
lowing three questions:
• Do changes to market scenario impact CAT events?
• Do CAT events impact the market scenario?
• Are there other factors that may cause CAT events and changes to the
market scenario move together?
Regarding the ﬁrst and third questions, it seems reasonable to assume that
market scenarios or other risks do not directly impact CAT events, given that
these are ofter considered a force majeure, unpredictable by their nature.
Regarding the second question, although it would sound intuitive that the
occurrence of CAT events tend to lead to negative variations in the market
scenario, historical observations look like such relation is not statistically
signiﬁcant, as can easily shown by comparing the twenty largest insured
losses from 1970 to 2010 reported by Swiss Re Economic Research with the
equity index of the location of each catastrophe and with the MSCI world
(as the global equity index)2. However, given that the time series used in
1IVASS, Regolamento 20 (2008 updated in April 2014), states that ﬁrms must under-
stand the nature of their mapped, their roots and potential correlation, the potential or
necessity to control and the eﬀects they can yield to
2The daily, monthly, quarterly and yearly returns after the date of the catastrophe
were analysed
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this analysis is not long enough (<40 years) to capture CAT events occuring
in a 1-in-200 (99,5%-ile) adverse scenario, it is reasonable to assume a 25%
correlation, which is indeed consistent with the calibrated correlation in the
Standard Formula.
Furthermore, in order to allow a Monte Carlo simulation of real-world
scenarios, a two-factors Gaussian copula was used, calibrated with 25% cor-
relation between the two risk factors (CAT and Market risks).
The process of generating a set of real world scenario simulation in or-
der to calculate economic capital and project dividends is described in the
following sub-section.
3.2.3 Calculating the Required Economic Capital
The minimum capital will not be anymore only derived as the original equity
put aside by investors. Consistently with the capital and risk measures
introduced in sections 2.4 and 2.5, it will now be deﬁned as the Required
Economic Capital, which can be approximated as the Value at Risk at a
99.5% conﬁdence level of the technical result over a 1-year projection period
(as long as the assumption holds that the tail of reserve risk is not material).
In general, the calculation of Economic Capital consists on four steps:
• generate a set of real world scenarios;
• simulate, for each scenario generated, the value of each balance sheet
item and of the 1-year technical result (proﬁt or loss);
• calculate the percentile and the SCR;
• recalculate the projected dividends under diﬀerent scenarios.
3.2.3.1 Real World scenarios generation
Generating S real world scenarios using a copula involves ﬁnding the joint
distribution of a set of n risk drivers. This can be achieved through the
following algorithm:
1. generate S realizations of n standard normal distributions. It is neces-
sary to make a choice on the random number generator (in this example
we used the Mersenne Twister algorithm).
{(z1, ..., zn)s}Ss=1 , Zi ∼ N (0, 1) i.i.d.
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2. apply the selected copula without specifying the desired marginal dis-
tribution to calculate a set of n normal random variables (Risk Drivers)
having the desired dependency structure. An example of how to do this
is provided by McNeil et Al. in [36]. Here the choice must be made
to choose and calibrate the copula (in this case, a gaussian copula
with a correlation coeﬃcient of 25% is used). We therefore deﬁne the
following copula function:
C [F1 (z1) , ..., Fn (zn)] = F
{
F−11 [Z0,1 (z)] , ..., F
−1
n [Z0,1 (z)]
}
(3.12)
where F is the desired multivariate distribution, Z0,1 is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution and F−1i (x)
is the desired marginal distribution. Using this formula (known as
Sklar's Theorem) allows the problem of specifying a complex multi-
variate distribution to be decomposed into the problem of specifying
a choice of copula and a choice of marginal distributions for each risk
factor3. In the case of a Gaussian copula this step consists in ap-
plying the Cholesky decomposition to the correlation matrix (which
should be positive semi-deﬁnite), and then using the Cholesky matrix
to transform the uncorralated variables into correlated variables; in
the following numerical example we used the algorithm proposed by
Rebonato in [43];
3. apply Marginal Transformation (in this case empirical loss distribu-
tions) to calculate a set of S realizations (in this application S = 1, 000)
of n (here n = 2) correlated risk factors (i.e. Real World scenarios).
So that we have
Xi = F
−1
i [Z0,1 (z)] (3.13)
In this case, the marginal distributions are:
(a) a lognormal distribution as the CAT risk driver;
(b) an empirical distribution of asset returns as the market risk driver,
simulated using a two factor market model.
3A wealth of literature now exist on this topic, see for example McNeil et Al. [36] for
an introductory description of a variety of copulas and Marshal et Al. [34] for a focus on
the use of Gaussian and T copulas
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In other words, in step 2 above a risk drivers scenario set is generated,
describing the full dependency structure. All risk-drivers are standard-
normally-distributed. In step 3, risk factors are then attached to the risk
drivers to create a risk factors scenario set, having the appropriate marginal
distributions. Note that multiple risk factors can be attached to a single risk
driver; in these cases, the marginal distributions of each risk factor can diﬀer,
however the risk factors will be 100% correlated. For instance, we may have
that the exchange rate related to two diﬀerent currencies may be modelled
as two diﬀerent risk factors, however if one of the two is linked to the other
one (e.g. for monetary policy constraints), then they are 100% correlate and
might both be linked to the same underlying risk driver.
3.2.3.2 Proﬁt/Loss simulation
Using the proﬁtability formulae 3.4 and 3.5 previously deﬁned, a set of S =
1, 000 proﬁts and losses can be simulated for each of the 1,000 real world
scenarios generated.
3.2.3.3 REC calculation
Required Economic Capital is calculated based on the set of S = 1, 000 simu-
lated losses, using some sort of distribution-based risk measure. Care should
be taken with regards to minority interest and fungibility rules, especially
in the case of a Group calculation. On a pure Solvency II basis, losses are
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between basic own funds at time t = 0 and basic
own funds in the simulated real world scenario. In this case, the REC is de-
ﬁned as the 99.5%-ile of the empirical distribution of the simulated technical
result.
Remark 3.2 When dealing with distribution's tails, as it is the case when
calculating REC using a VaR approach through a Monte Carlo simulation,
attention should be paid to ensure that convergence is achieved. Even if
performing a proper convergence study is out of scope for this analysis, a
convergence test has been performed by repeating the REC calculation by
setting S1 = 10, 000, S2 = 50, 000 and S3 = 100, 000, and verifying the
change in REC was below 5% and marginally decreasing with Si.
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3.2.4 An EC-adjusted dividends model
This subsection shows how formulae described in 3.1 are adjusted in an
Economic Capital framework.
First of all, the level of dividends that can be paid out also depend on
how required economic capital moved. For example, even if net proﬁt was
zero and available capital was unchanged, then the ﬁrm would still be able
to pay out dividends up to any negative change in the required economic
capital. In other word, the 3.2 changes into the following:
δmaxt,t,+1 = ς [Πt,t+1 − (AECt −AECt+1) + (RACt −RACt+1)] (3.14)
where ς expresses the dividends strategy of the management, which will
be further discussed in chapter 4.
Furthermore, the operating proﬁt also changes to consider that:
• investment return from premiums and capital is a portfolio return
rather than a risk free return;
• asset return rptft,t+1 and claims are modelled together.
In other words, the 3.4 becomes:
OPt,t+1 = TRt,t+1+r
ptf
t,t+1Ct+r
ptf
t,t+1Pt

< −AECt, bankrupt
∈ [−AECt, 0] , necessary to raiseNt at costCoC
> 0, surplus can be used to rebuild capital
(3.15)
3.3 Results: more volatile dividends
This subsection is dedicated to the results of an application deﬁned in the
framework deﬁned above.
The assumptions of the simulation are summarized in in Table 3.1.
In terms of CAT risk modelling, the aggregated claims' amount has been
modelled by using a lognormal distribution, parameterized in four diﬀerent
ways reﬂecting the ﬁrm's underwriting policy, as summarized in Table 3.2.
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Item Value Comments
CoC 10%
e% 0% Premiums are deﬁned net of expenses
C0 10M
rf 3% Risk free rate (annual discounting)
τ 25%
Table 3.1: Hypotheses of the model
U/W policy CoV µ σ E (Y ) (M) StDev (Y )
A 0,1 0,831 0,066 2,300 0,862
B 1 -0,413 0,549 0,769 1,086
C 10 -2,647 1,416 0,193 0,772
D 20 -3,156 1,613 0,157 0,770
Table 3.2: Potential claims' distributions under four diﬀerent underwriting
policies
Based on the input above, we calculated a set of 1,000 simulations of
5-years patterns of:
• claims amount;
• premium in-ﬂows, calculated on the model speciﬁed in the 3.6;
• asset returns.
The 1,000 simulations are real-world scenarios, if the model's assumptions
hold. This is because a Gaussian copula was used in order to deﬁne the joint
distribution of claims' amounts (aﬀected by CAT risk) and asset returns (af-
fected by market risk), following the Gaussian algorithm deﬁned by McNeil
et Al. in [36].
Figure 3.1 shows the diﬀerence between traditional vs. the EC-driven
proﬁtability models of the ﬁrm's simulated operating result projected for 5
years in two cases:
• using underwriting (U/W) policy B (rather conservative), having a
coeﬃcient of variation of 1;
• using U/W policy D (rather aggressive), having a coeﬃcient of varia-
tion of 20.
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In the ﬁgure, we show 4 percentiles of the distributions of projected results,
i.e. the 0.5% (1 in 200 adverse event), the 10% (1 in 10 adverse event),
the 50% (the expected event) and the 90% (the 1 in 10 favourable event).
Results show that:
• the ﬁrm still makes proﬁts in a 1 in 10 adverse event using both U/W
policies;
• if we move from a prudent to an aggressive U/W policy, the distribu-
tion of operating results get squeezed beyond the 10%-ile, i.e. the
diﬀerence between proﬁt made in a 1 in 10 adverse event and a 1 in 10
favourable event is smaller in U/W policy D than in U/W policy B;
• in an EC-driven model, operating results tend to be higher than using
the traditional approach, especially in adverse scenarios; this is related
to the following complementary eﬀects:
 the introduction of a dependency structure among the risk drivers
leads to stabilizing the result, reducing extreme losses, and
 the market model tends to have a positive impact on returns com-
pared to risk free returns.
However, when the two models are compared using projected dividends,
as shown in Figure 3.2 we ﬁnd that:
• the ﬁrm cancels dividends only in a 1 in 200 adverse event in both
scenarios and using both the models;
• dividends are much more unstable in an EC-driven model - namely, in
year 2 and 3 using an EC-driven model allows paying more dividends,
while in year 4 and 5 the stream of dividends drops.
We conclude that, even if using a realistic economic capital model allows to
• mitigate the risk of extreme operating losses, and
• recognize proﬁts to shareholders on a more timely basis,
nevertheless, the dividends' ﬂow becomes much more volatile, and thus
makes it necessary to actively identify capital management plans and con-
tingency actions.
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Figure 3.1: Operating proﬁt projected for 5 years tends to be more stable
under extreme scenarios in an EC-framework independently of the risk proﬁle
of the ﬁrm (M)
Figure 3.2: Dividends get more volatile due to the pro-cyclical eﬀect fostered
by the SCR (M)
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3.4 A few considerations on market consistent va-
luations
Evidences shown in this chapter are just results from a simulation study, and
are not aimed at demonstrating that these results are consistently achieved
or observed in the market. However, this simulation study leads to draw a
few conclusions which are important in a game changer event like Solvency
II:
• dividends tend to be more unstable if the balance sheet is valued on a
market consistent basis, depending on the market scenario;
• the calculation of projected market consistent balance sheet (including
the required economic capital) can be extremely intensive (especially
for ﬁrms writing policies with ﬁnancial guarantees, where the nested
stochastic problem is more relevant); hence, a trade-oﬀ between calcu-
lation performance and modelling accuracy must be shought;
• it is very key that management properly understand the models and
their output and are able to act as a consequence, identifying the ac-
tions able to adjust the ﬁrm's strategy towards business and risks, by
ordinary actions (e.g. deﬁning the dividends policy), extraordinary
actions (e.g. driving the M&A activities) and all the other business
initiatives that can be proposed (product structuring/pricing, strate-
gic asset allocation, etc.).
Such considerations are in line with the comments of one of the main charac-
ters of the latest insurance industry debate, i.e. Tidjane Thiam, who, in one
of his ﬁnal conference call as CEO of Prudential plc, highlighted two areas
of concerns in Solvency II:
• the 2008-2009 global ﬁnancial crisis showed that market consistency
doesn't really work because of the pro-cyclicality within a Solvency II
valuation model;
• valuing insurance liabilities using a risk free curve during a period when
monetary policy had driven interest rates to exceptionally low levels,
threatening the ability of insurers to continue to provide retirement
solutions to Europe's ageing population, and a solvency test would
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force insurers to liquidate risky assets at depressed prices in response to
a market crisis, increasing systemic risk at a time where the long-term
nature of insurance assets and liabilities should be a source of stability.
However, as another relevant ﬁgure of the current debate on market consi-
stent valuations demonstrates in [52], it could be argued that
Some in the industry characterize market-consistent valu-
ations as too volatile and not reﬂective of the long term eco-
nomics of the business. But what if market-consistent approaches
better reﬂect the way that our shares are actually valued [by in-
vestors]? In this case, value managers who do not like either the
volatility in the measures or in their share price should address
the underlying business model rather than shoot the messenger.
In the context of such a debate, the purpose of the next chapter is to dis-
cuss how in a market consistent, risk-based world, the increased instability
arising from the market can be actively managed by ﬁrms' top management
by consistently steering business, managing risks and choosing modelling
techniques in an holistic risk-adjusted strategic framework.
Chapter 4
Risk-based strategies to steer
the company: A new hera in
strategic planning
In Europe, Solvency II requires1 that any ﬁrm should take into account
the results of the ORSA2 and the insights gained during the process of this
assessment in at least:
• its business planning;
• its capital management;
• its product development and design.
This sets the ground for a new way in which ﬁrms should set up their strategy
and plan/monitor their business. In this chapter we are going to:
• recap the key ingredients necessary to perform a business planning
exercise (section 4.1);
• explore how management actions and intiatives can be assessed and
selected in a risk-adjusted framework by using an Economic Capital
model (section 4.2);
• discuss how ﬁrms can manage capital and deﬁne a dividends policy
coherently with their risk appetite (section 4.3);
1EIOPA Guidelines [21]
2Own Risk and Solvency Assessment
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• propose a new approach to allow for risk in product pricing in Non-life
business (section 4.4).
Note that the framework described in this chapter has been used for training
purposes on many levels, namely:
• actuarial and business students;
• professional trainings for non-executives;
• laboratory for managers and executives.
4.1 The strategic planning process
Strategic planning is a key phase in which the Board of Directors formally
sets the strategy they want the company to pursue and present it to share-
holders and to the market in general. The process leading to business plan
sign oﬀ is also the opportunity for the Top management to set up, propose
and get approved the various initiatives they want to foster in the company
to the Board.
Traditionally, three ingrediends are considered to produce a business
plan:
• market position, i.e. the position of the company in the market context.
This involves analysing both qualitative and quantitative factors, such
as:
 the history of the company, e.g. how long has it been active in the
market, in which geographies, writing which business lines etc.;
 the ﬁrm's brand and reputation, e.g. areas which the ﬁrm's stake-
holders consider as strenght or weaknesses (where ﬁrm's stake-
holders are shareholders, policyholders, supervisory authorities,
the market in general);
 the core values of the company, sometimes formalized in internal
regulations, e.g. whether the company aims to be particularly
focused on businesses of a speciﬁc geography (e.g. factories of
a region)/ a speciﬁc sector (e.g. agricultural), or is willing to
deal with public welfare (e.g. formerly state-owned insurers) or
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to push on the innovation side (e.g. wants to be perceived as the
high-tech insurer);
 the client base, e.g. whether the policyholders are households or
corporates, old or young retail;
 the distribution network, i.e. whether products are distributed
through agencies, broker, bankassurance or by direct online busi-
ness;
 the volume and structure of the balance sheet at time 0 compared
to peers;
 the split by line of business of premiums and comparison with the
market.
• key market trends, meaning the main topics which are being discussed
in the market or the key evolution of the industry expected in the next
few years. As an example, market trends which are being discussed in
the market at the time of writing were:
 the evolution of the regulatory landscape (e.g. given by the roll-
out of Solvency II, the evolution driven by Miﬁd 2 and the evolving
ﬁscal policies on products and distribution);
 life product innovation (e.g. decreased attractiveness of unit linked
life product in a low interest rate environment, new customer
needs given the increased longevity, etc.);
 ALM and asset management evolution (e.g. in terms of more
evolved asset allocation strategies);
 telematics (meaning the use of technology to prevent and manage
non-life technical risks);
 digital and distribution (e.g. the so-called multi-channel distribu-
tion);
 Big Data (to support decision making and pricing processes)
• strategic targets in terms of
 growth (e.g. premium volumes), and
 proﬁtability (e.g. measured as Return on Equity).
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Traditionally, strategic planning was the process of analysing the three set of
ingredients above and translate them into a single picture providing all the
business initiatives aiming to achieve the stated targets. The key additional
ingredient ﬁrms will nowadays need to allow for is risk, which is commonly
measured in terms of solvency (in the sense in which it was deﬁned in chapter
2). Risk can be allowed for in two ways:
• as a constraint, e.g. through the deﬁnitions of limits on a number of
business metrics;
• as an additional target, i.e. by deﬁning a Risk Appetite which the
ﬁrms should aim to be aligned to.
Such ways are very closely linked to each other, however the spirit is very
diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst case, risk is seen as a constraint which the business
structure (be it investments, product desing, underwriting, etc.) should
comply with. In the second, risk becomes an additional target, enabling the
Top Management to design management actions which best tie the Board
aspirations with the ﬁrm's capacity.
For example, in the case of ALM, risk as a constraint would be considered
by deﬁniting limits in the mismatch between the duration of assets and of
liabilities, which is a measure reﬂecting one of the sources for interest rate
risk; risk as an additional target would be to consider the economic value
added by the ALM function. A comprehensive assessment of the linkage
between risk appetite and strategic planning is provided by the International
Actuarial Association in [45].
Given the complex multi-dimensional problem that a strategic plan aims
at solving, a sound process should be set up, which makes the involvment of
several ﬁrm's departments necessary.
The steps to be followed are the following six:
1. set up an initial strategy, by identifying and quantifying the proposed
initiatives consistently with market position and market trends;
2. project balance sheet and proﬁtability over a multi-year time horizon,
which inlcudes projecting balance sheet items and proﬁtability mea-
sures both in a best estimate case (i.e. the one deemed to be the most
likely) as well as in stressed scenarios;
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3. assess the level of risk embedded in the initial strategy, also in terms of
capital absorption as well as of exposure to non quantiﬁed risks (e.g.
reputational);
4. analyse potential additional actions in terms of business, product and
capital initiatives, and consequently update the plan (including the
dividends policy);
5. identify potential corrective actions on business initiatives and product
and capital plans in case of adverse scenarios (so called contingency
planning);
6. pull the ﬁnal plan together, discuss/ approve it in the Board and com-
municate it to the market.
The following section present a study aiming to assess a number of potential
management actions considering an illustrative composite insurance Group.
As such they can be considered as a deep-dive into step 4 in the risk-adjusted
strategic planning process deﬁned above.
4.2 Using an EC-model to select management ini-
tiatives
In this section we set up a model to investigate on the performance of an
hypothetical insurance group in diﬀerent business circumstances. Then, we
use such model to show how RAPMs can be used in practice in order to take
management decision allowing for risk. In order to do so, in this section we
assess the strategies the top management is considering to take through a
model which reﬂects:
• the fundamental features of the ﬁrm, e.g. its company structure, its
in-force business and distribution network, its asset portfolio and the
dependency structure of the risks it is exposed to;
• the risk and business strategy set up by the Board;
• the rose of potential actions which the management is considering.
The output of the model is a mix of quantitative measures of proﬁtability
and risk and qualitative recommendations on actions to take. The model
works in four steps:
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1. deﬁne Group's asset and liability proﬁle at time 0;
2. project proﬁtability and balance sheet under the base scenario;
3. deﬁne the management initiatives to be tested and assess them in a
risk-adjusted framework;
4. select the optimal actions to be taken and included in the business
plan.
In the next sub-sections, we are going to consider each of these steps.
4.2.1 Description of the hypothetical composite Group
Let us consider a hypothetical insurance group that consists of three business
units. A business unit is deﬁned here as a single legal entity (subsidiary);
the structure of the balance sheet as well as the main characteristics of the
subsidiaries are provided in the following paragraphs.
4.2.1.1 Starting balance sheet at time t=0
The assumed balance sheet of the group and its subsidiaries at the beginning
of the period is summarised in Table 4.1. Under this base scenario we assume
that the Group's balance sheet is equally split between the three subsidiaries.
Remark 4.1
We assume that, given that the balance sheet is market consistent, equity
coincides with Available Economic Capital. Such capital, however, is not
risk adjusted; the risk-adjusted capital will need to be deﬁned as a percentile
in the distribution of negative changes in the Available Economic Capital,
depending on the ﬁrm's risk appetite, following the logics explained in section
2.5.2.
4.2.1.2 Characteristics of the business units
The main characteristics of the business units in terms of risk/return proﬁle
are summarized as follows:
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Assets (m) , T = 0 BU1 BU2 BU3 Group
Stocks 45 45 45 135
ZC Bonds 45 45 45 135
Cash 10 10 10 30
Total 100 100 100 300
Liabilities (m),T=0 BU1 BU2 BU3 Group
Liability 75 75 75 225
- Technical provisions 70 70 70 210
- Other liabilities 5 5 5 15
Equity 25 25 25 75
Total 100 100 100 300
Table 4.1: Illustrative balance sheet at time 0
• Business Unit 1 is a life subsidiary providing the lowest level of risk
and the lowest expected return of all three BUs;
• Business Unit 2 is very similar to BU1, except it is slightly more risky
and earns slightly higher return on a standalone basis. BU2 is also
highly correlated with BU1 both in terms of equity return and under-
writing results dynamics;
• Business Unit 3 is a non-life subsidiary providing the highest risk and
the highest return on a standalone basis, both in terms of equity returns
and underwriting results. BU3 is negatively correlated with the other
BUs. In this sense, BU3 can be considered as a hedging element
within the group that can potentially bring the highest diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt to the group3;
• All Business Units have a partially matched asset-liability position,
with only 64% of insurance liabilities being matched by the same du-
ration zero-coupon bonds. The rest of the insurance liabilities are
covered by equity, which should be one of the main risk sources for all
three BUs.
3Negative correlation is assumed between this BU and the other in order to better
illustrate the role played by diversiﬁcation beneﬁt. In practice, we don't refer to any evi-
dence demonstrating that a negative correlation holds between Life and Non-life business
units (unless in speciﬁc cases such as, for instance, Life BUs which invest in Non-life CAT
bonds, or Non-life BUs investing in Longevity swaps).
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Parameter BU1 BU2 BU3
Equity return 4% 5% 6%
Equity std. dev. 10% 20% 30%
Risk free rate (expected return) 2.5%
Risk free rate (std. dev.) 0.5%
UW expected return (to liability value) 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
UW return (to liability value) std. dev. 0.6% 1.2% 2.5%
Duration of ZC bonds (year) 15 15 15
Tax rate 25%
Cost of Capital 10%
Table 4.2: Model assumptions related to the risk factors which the Group is
exposed to
Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 IR Life_UW1 Life_UW2 N-L_UW
Eq.1 1.0 0.8 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Eq.2 0.8 1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Eq.3 -0.3 -0.3 1.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
IR -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Life_UW1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 -0.5
Life_UW2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 -0.5
Non-life_UW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 1.0
Table 4.3: Rank correlations among the Group risk factors
4.2.1.3 Risk mapping and dependency structure
The modeling assumptions related to assets, liabilities and expected business
proﬁles of each of the business units are summarized in Table 4.2. Note
that all returns here are assumed to be net of tax total returns (annual
compounding).
Equity returns, IR and underwriting results are based on multivariate
normal distribution with the correlation matrix shown in Table 4.3.
An illustrative example of how to calibrate such correlations can be found
in the previous chapter (see 3.2.2).
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Remark 4.2 In this exercise we assume that:
1. each subsidiary is exposed to a unique equity risk driver : this means
that such risk driver will be composed of a basket of equities represent-
ing the exposure of the BU. Such assumption is often employed when
an internal model needs to be calibrated for Groups having many sub-
sidiaries;
2. interest rate risk is only captured by modelling the value of a generic
1-year risk-free interest rate: clearly this is a simpliﬁcation, given that
a proper interest rate model for the whole interest rate term structure
should have been deﬁned (see, for instance, De Felice and Moriconi
in [13] for a dissertation on how to allow for interest rate risk in life
business modelling); furthermore, all ﬁxed income portfolio is not ex-
posed to credit risk (which is consistent with the standard formula
assumption that sovereign bonds are risk-invariant);
3. technical proﬁt arising from pure life and non-life underwriting risk
is modelled using an ad-hoc risk driver for each BU, which aims at
reﬂecting the underwriting policy of the BU; of course, in order to
properly model such technical margin an EV-type analysis would be
preferable (e.g. in order to isolate technical proﬁt from investment
proﬁt), as shown, for example, by De Felice and Moriconi in [14].
Such simpliﬁcations are only valid to the extent that the purpose of this
exercise is to show how an EC-model can be used to inform management
decisions and to deﬁne a more risk-based business planning, rather than to
investigate the most accurate way in order to build such an EC-model.
In order to be used for simulation purposes, this correlation matrix was
made PSD (positive semi-deﬁnite) by using the Optimized Correlation ma-
trix method, which is based on the methodology suggested by Rebonato
and Jackel in [29].
A matrix is not PSD if it has at least one negative eigenvalue. This
method ﬁnds a valid (i.e. PSD) correlation matrix C composed of d2 elements
(where d in this case is the number of risk driver, i.e. 7) that is closest to
the input correlation matrix A with respect to a distance D deﬁned through
optimization weights. Namely, the algorithm minimizes the distance
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D =
√∑
i,j
wi,j (ci,j − ai,j)2
where wi,j are the d
2 elements of a matrix of weights, which here are set to
1, but could be used in order to ensure that some elements of the matrix
(e.g. the ones where the experts have consolidated their view) change less
then others. The method is widely used in the market, especially for ﬁrms
whose entity structure and risk mapping makes the matrix extremely big
(e.g. where d = 1, 500).
4.2.2 Projecting P&L and B/S at time 1 under the base
scenariob
Given the BS at t=0 and the assumptions of expected values of all the risk
drivers (3 for equities, 1 for interest rates and 3 for the underwriting result
of each of the BU), we produce the expected proﬁt (or loss) observed during
the year as well as the expected BS at t=1. The results are given in Table
4.4:
Note that, consistently with the remark in the previous subsection, the
following simplistic assumptions have been used in the model:
• underwriting results are obtained by applied the corresponding ex-
pected Underwriting result rate to the corresponding liability values
at t=0 (note that this assumption could be relaxed by employing a
proxy model such as the curve ﬁtting approach described in 2.5.3);
• the Cash position at t=1 is equal to the sum of four components:
 the starting cash amount at t=0;
 return earned on cash during the year (assumed to be equal to
the risk-free interest rate);
 underwriting results earned during the year;
 tax paid during the year;
• technical provisions are assumed to grow with the risk free interest rate
according to a zero coupon bond model with the duration 15 years (also
this assumption could be relaxed by employing a proxy model such as
the curve ﬁtting approach described in 2.5.3).
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P&L (m), year 1 BU1 BU2 BU3 Group
UW result 1.2 1.4 1.5 4.1
Stocks 1.8 2.3 2.7 6.8
ZC bonds 1.1 1.1 1.1 3.4
Cash 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8
Technical provisions (1,8) (1,8) (1,8) (5.3)
Other liabilities (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.4)
Operating proﬁt 2.5 3.1 3.7 9.3
Tax (0.6) (0.8) (0.9) (2.3)
Net proﬁt 1.9 2.3 2.8 7.0
B/S item (m), t=1 BU1 BU2 BU3 Group
Stocks 46.8 47.3 47.7 141.8
ZC Bonds 46.1 46.1 46.1 138.4
Cash 10.8 10.8 10.8 32.5
Total Assets 103.7 104.2 104.7 312.6
Technical provisions 71.8 71.8 71.8 215.3
Other liabilities 5.1 5.1 5.1 15.4
Total Liabilities 76.9 76.9 76.9 230.6
Equity 26.9 27.3 27.8 82.0
Table 4.4: Group B/S projected to time 1 (Base senario)
Results in Table 4.4 only show expected P&L and B/S at the year end. This
calculation does not make any allowance for riskiness of returns. A simulation
based valuation is required in order to estimate the required economic capital
as well as other risk-adjusted measures based on it.
In summary, the RAPMs calculation process involves three steps:
1. real world simulation of the Balance sheet at time 1 through a Monte
Carlo approach;
2. calculation of both standalone and diversiﬁed required economic capital
(REC);
3. calculation of the set of RAPMs chosen by the top management.
We describe these calculations in the next three paragraphs.
4.2.2.1 Real-world simulation of the Balance sheet at time 1
Having deﬁned a distribution of the key risk drivers (3 for equities, 1 for
interest rates and 3 for the underwriting result), we use these assumptions in
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a Monte Carlo simulation in order to calculate the proﬁt (or loss) distribution
of each of the business units and of the group as a whole. The proﬁt (or loss)
distributions obtained are used to calculate the Economic Capital values.
We perform Monte Carlo simulation with 20,000 scenarios. The same
random seed is used for diﬀerent runs of the model under diﬀerent starting
parameters. Under each random scenario, a full P&L and B/S at t=1 are
projected, allowing to have a unique total loss distribution for the BUs and
the Group.
Remark 4.3 In theory, modelling the Solvency II balance sheet would
imply a number of complications, namely in order to calculate the value
of ﬁnancial guarantees embedded in the Life participating business. This
problem involves the so-called nested stochastic problem. As discussed in
2.5.3, the industry developed advanced proxy models, such as Replicating
portfolios, Least Square Monte Carlo and Curve ﬁtting.
Such proxy models have the great advantage to be usable in a timely fashion,
which is extremely important for a model to meet the key requirement for
each model, i.e. to be used in the business decision making processes (the
so called Use Test).
On the other side, the loss of accuracy and the contiuous advances made in
term of computational techniques and computational power makes it reason-
able to believe that in the coming years pure nested stochastic calculations
will eﬀectively become a viable solution.
In this application, however, the simplistic assumptions we made makes it
possible to calculate the value of each component of the B/S using simple
closed formulae approach, and apply it to each of the simulated real-world
scenario.
4.2.2.2 Calculation of Required Economic Capital
The amount of economic capital which the ﬁrm is required to hold can be
based on diﬀerent risk measures (e.g. VaR, Tail-VaR, etc.) and diﬀerent
risk levels (e.g. percentile values for VaR being 99.5% on a 1 year horizon
or 99.9% on a 1 day horizon). The choice of the risk measure and of the
percentile may depend on the regulatory constraints or on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk appetite set by the Board. Once determined, Required Economic Ca-
pital is used in order to allocate Available Capital to diﬀerent BUs. In the
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Risk measure Standalone Allocated
Group
(m) BU1 BU2 BU3 BU1 BU2 BU3
VaR 99.5% 8.6 16.0 22.5 4.5 9.4 12.5 26.4
VaR 99.9% 10.9 19.2 26.3 6.0 12.4 14.4 32.8
T-VaR 99.5% 10.1 17.9 24.9 5.4 10.8 14.5 30.6
Table 4.5: REC results
model, we are using Euler allocation method. In case of VaR based EC,
Euler allocation is done by applying a kernel smoothing algorithm based on
the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator (seem for instance, the paper from
Tasche, [49]).
Remark 4.4 (on the role of risk appetite) In this exercise, we assume
that the appetite of the ﬁrm is to hold an amount of economic capital equal
to the VaR of the distribution of Basic Own Funds with a conﬁdence level
of 99.5% on a 1 year horizon. In a Solvency II world this coincides with the
SCR, i.e. the Required Economic Capital. Therefore, in this case the target
solvency ratio would be equal to 100% (which is very unlikely in practice,
given that most ﬁrms are targeting a Solvency II ratio between 150% and
200%). If Available Economic Capital goes above this threshold, than the
excedance is paid out as dividends. If, on the other side, available capital
goes below the risk appetite, then more available capital is needed, so that
if the ﬁrm is a holding company it will have to raise capital to the investors,
while if it is a subsidiary, then a capital injection by the holding company
will be required.
Table 4.5 shows the results of such calculations for our model with the
assumed distributions of the risk factors. In this case, we chose Required
Economic Capital to be deﬁned as a distributional risk measure, namely the
value at risk of the simulated distribution of operating proﬁt between time
t=0 and t=1.
4.2.2.3 Calculation of Risk Adjusted Performance
Based on B/S, P&L, EC and CoC values we can calculate the following
six key Performance Measures, consistently with the notation introduced in
Chapter 2:
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Standalone Diversiﬁed
Group
(m), t=0 BU1 BU2 BU3 BU1 BU2 BU3
Capital base employed in the performance calculation
Equity Capital 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 75.0
Economic Capital 8.6 16.0 22.5 4.5 9.4 12.5 26.4
P&L values employed in the performance calculation
Net proﬁt 1.9 2.3 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.8 7.0
Cost of capital (0.9) (1.6) (2.2) (0.4) (0.9) (1.3) (2.6)
EVA 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 4.3
Selected performance measures
RoE 7.4% 9.3% 11.2% 7.4% 9.3% 11.2% 9.3%
RoEC 21.4% 14.5% 12.5% 41.6% 24.7% 22.3% 26.4%
RARoC 13.2% 9.7% 7.4% 18.8% 18.4% 20.6% 19.3%
RARoRAC 11.4% 4.5% 2.5% 31.6% 14.7% 12.3% 16.4%
Table 4.6: Performance measures on the base scenario
• Economic Value Added (EVA), obtained as the net proﬁt adjusted for
the cost of holding the allocated Economic Capital in the company;
• Return on Equity (ROE), deﬁned as the net proﬁt divided by the equity
capital;
• Return on Economic Capital (RoEC), obtained as the ROE by repla-
cing the equity capital with the allocated Economic Capital; this is a
form of RoRAC (Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital) in which the cho-
sen RAC coincides with the SCR (i.e. the risk appetite is such that
REC = SCR), after considering the allocation of the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt;
• Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RARoC), deﬁned as EVA divided
by equity capital;
• Risk Adjusted Return on Risk Adjusted Capital (RARoRAC), deﬁned
as EVA divided by allocated Economic Capital.
Results are illustrated in Table 4.6.
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Remark 4.5 (on prospective vs retrospective analysis) The RAPM
results shown above and in the following sub-sections are based on a prospec-
tive analysis. Similar considerations could be made by performing a retro-
spective analysis, in which case proﬁtability actually realised (as opposed to
expected) should be taken as input, and then adjusted for the level of risk
taken.
Remark 4.6 (on the denominator of the RoEC) In deﬁning the RoEC
we used the Required Economic Capital as the denominator, as we would
expect in a generic RoRAC measure. In theory, however, it would be more
meaningful to replace the REC with AEC; in fact, using the Available Eco-
nomic Capital would increase the consistency of the RAPM assessment with
the budgeting phase, in which top management assigns a budget (and thus,
in a risk-based framework, allocates Available Economic Capital) to each
single business structure and business unit.
In this exercise, we decided to keep a REC-type denominator rather than
evolving it to an AEC-type, because of three reasons:
• Market practice: Firms historically tend to allocate the beneﬁt arising
from risk-diversiﬁcation rather than the actual capital available; while
the former is often done by the risk management function, the latter is
typically performed by the ﬁnance department in the budgeting phase;
• Scientiﬁc literature: In literature, capital allocation is usually referred
to risk capital allocation rather than available capital allocation (see,
for instance, [20, 49, 48]);
• Impact of capital management: If ﬁrms had eﬀective capital ma-
nagement plan and procedures, then the actual AEC would constantly
coincide with the internallly deﬁned REC, e.g. by
 having a dividends policy such that any excess of capital beyond
risk appetite is paid out as dividends;
 recovering any capital shortfall thorugh extraordinary capital in-
jections;
 ensuring that Group capital is allocated to each BUs consistently
with risk appetite towards each BU.
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4.2.3 Taking management decisions based on a RoEC opti-
mization strategy
In this subsection we demonstrate how a RAPM framework can be used
by Top Management to inform important business decisions by looking for
maximising ﬁrm's RAPM.
For the purpose of this example we have chosen a RoRAC measure, but
other RAPMs would be suitable in a similar way.
We start by considering the range of situations we want to investigate;
then, for each situation, we show the decisions that would be employed if a
ROE-based strategy was followed (i.e. not considering risk) rather than a
RoRAC based one (i.e. in a risk-adjusted framework). We also show that
optimal business decisions taken on the basis of ROEC and ROE information
may be opposite to each other.
In the next paragraphs, we want to study the eﬀect of the following
management levers4:
1. diversiﬁcation among Business Units;
2. change exposure to Business Units;
3. change in strategic asset allocation and ALM position;
4. change underwriting and reinsurance policies.
4.2.3.1 Eﬀect of diversiﬁcation among business units
Although under the Base scenario the balance sheet of the three BUs are
identical (see Table 4.1), the risk/return characteristics and hence the risk
adjusted performance measures of the three are diﬀerent (see Table 4.6).
Before assessing any new management action, we are going to analyze the
current expected RAPM values of the Base scenario (described in Subsection
4.2.1.2) and the contributions that diﬀerent factors had to this position.
There are two main factors in the base risk position:
• diﬀerent return/volatility characteristics of equity and underwriting
results;
4The order of such investigation follows the will to (1) ﬁrst analyze the status quo in
terms of risk proﬁle and diversiﬁcation eﬀects, (2) then optimize such diverﬁcation beneﬁt
through an optimal capital allocation, and, ﬁnally, set up optimal (3) asset and (4) liability
management strategies.
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Figure 4.1: Eﬀect of diversiﬁcation among BUs on ROEC and on ROE
• diﬀerent correlation assumptions between them.
In order to assess impact of these two factors separately, below we consider
two additional scenarios:
A. Identical BUs: Group B/S is kept as in the Base scenario (i.e.
it is equally distributed across the three BUs), however the dis-
tribution of Return on Equity and of underwriting results is the
same (as the ones of BU2) for all three BUs, and all the risk
factors are uncorrelated among diﬀerent BUs;
B. Diversiﬁcation: Initial B/Ss and distribution of returns are as-
sumed to be as in scenario A, but now the correlation matrix
between the risk factors being the same as of the Base scenario
(i.e. BU1 and BU2 are positively correlated, while BU3 is nega-
tively correlated with BU1 and BU2).
The third scenario we consider is the Base scenario, as already described in
Subsection 4.2.1.2. In particular, we have that:
• BU1 provides lower return and risk, BU2 is in the middle, and BU3
oﬀers highest return and risk;
• BU1 and BU2 are positively correlated, while BU3 is negatively corre-
lated with BU1 and BU2.
The RoEC and ROE proﬁles of the Group under the three scenarios are
shown in the ﬁgure 4.1 (note the change on the y-axis scale).
The analysis of the obtained results leads us to a number of comments:
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• all three business units provide the same standalone RoEC in scenarios
A and B. This is because correlation between BUs has no impact on
standalone ECs;
• in the Base scenario, the standalone RoEC performance of BU1 im-
proves due to a lower level of risk, while the corresponding ROE move-
ment is opposite to this;
• on the diversiﬁed basis in scenario A, even though the three BUs are
absolutely identical in terms of risk/return characteristics, there is still
some diﬀerence between the ROEC results. This is caused by simula-
tion error under the method of Euler allocation of REC5;
• the updated correlation structure of scenario B leads the diversiﬁed
ROEC of BU3 to become the highest of all three BUs (as its allocated
REC is the lowest). This is caused by the negative correlation with
the rest of the Group. BU3 may be considered as a hedging element
of the Group;
• when diﬀerent levels of risk and return of BUs are introduced in the
Base scenario, the least risky BU1 overperforms the other BUs on a
ROEC basis. In this case the negative impact of the high riskiness of
BU3 has overweighted the positive impacts of its highest return and
negative correlation with other BUs
• diversiﬁcation has no impact on the ROE results. The best BU will
always be the one yielding the highest return (i.e. BU3 in our case)
regardlessly the level of risk taken or its impact on the overall risk
position of the Group.
4.2.3.2 Action 1: Investing more heavily in one of the business
units
In this numerical example, the ﬁrst management action the Top Management
is considering is to rebalance the Group's B/S by changing exposures to
diﬀerent BUs.
5Despite of the 20,000 simulations used and the kernel smoothing techniques applied,
the allocated VaR values will still be largely based just on a small number of simulations
that deliver a total loss close to the VaR value. This causes relatively high volatility of
the metrics that are based on the allocated REC values.
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Figure 4.2: Action 1 - Impact of a changed allocation of resources among
the BUs
In practice this can be done e.g. by consolidating or selling out part of
the equity of given BUs in order to increase or reduce Group's share in them;
or making decision on growth/reduction strategies for some BUs. The two
formalised scenarios which the management of the company need to choose
from are the following:
C. Increase exposure to the hedging BU: The Group increases its
exposure to BU3 by 25% and reduces its exposure to BU1 by the
same 25% (we assume proportional increase/reduction of all the
current balance sheet items for the eﬀected BUs). This decision
could be motivated by increasing exposure to a business unit,
which is negatively correlated with the rest of the Group, in a
hope of gaining more diversiﬁcation beneﬁt for the Group;
D. Increase exposure to less risky BU: This scenario is opposite to
the previous one, as the Group reduces its exposure to BU3 by
25% while increases its exposure to BU1 by the same 25% (again,
we assume proportional impacts on the balance sheet items).
This decision could be motivated by increasing exposure to the
least risky business unit in a hope of decreasing the overall risk
of the Group.
ROEC and ROE results for these two scenarios are shown in Figure 4.2,
comparatively to the Base scenario (note the change on the y-axis scale).
The analysis of the obtained results leads us to a number of comments:
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• as expected, there is no impact on standalone RoEC performance as
the balance sheet of the single BUs is just scaled up or down under
the two scenarios leaving the ratio between expected return and the
standalone REC numbers unaﬀected;
• under both scenarios the diversiﬁed RoEC goes up for those BUs where
capital is withdrawn. An interpretation for this may be that when a
business unit becomes smaller its unique risk proﬁle does better absorb
risks of the rest of the group raising bigger share of the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt to it. By doing this a business unit is eﬀectively taking a role
of the hedging element of the Group (in our case it's BU1 in scenario
C and BU3 in scenario D);
• Group's RoEC is maximised in scenario D, when investing more on the
BU which overperforms the others under the Base scenario (i.e. BU1).
Note that in this case the performance of each single BUs in the Group
becomes more homogenous;
• on a ROE basis, the conclusion is very diﬀerent: while standalone
performance of single BUs is unchanged, Group's ROE improves when
higher exposure is given to BU3 (i.e. the high-yield high-risk choice)
and go down in scenario D (i.e. when investing more on the low-yield
low-risky BU1).
Based on the above, the optimal decision based on the RoEC results is taken
scenario D (i.e. increase exposure to BU1, which had the best performance
under the Base scenario). It's interesting that by doing so the RoEC based
performance of the most risky BU3 will be also improved as it will deliver
more diversiﬁcation beneﬁt.
4.2.3.3 Action 2. Changing the Strategic Asset Allocation and
the ALM position
Say that, following considerations in the previous subsection, the ﬁrm's Top
Management has opted for Scenario D, thus investing more in BU1. The
next management action they are considering is to improve performance of
BU1 and BU2 by changing their ALM strategies.
At the moment both BUs invest 45% in equity (diﬀerent for all BUs),
45% in zero-coupon bonds (ZCB) of the same duration as insurance liabili-
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ties, and 10% in cash. Given the insurance liabilities constitute 70% of the
B/S for both BUs, their coverage by the perfectly matching ZCBs is only
45%/70%=64%, with the rest of insurance liabilities being covered by risky
equities. Management of the Group perceives BU2 as being too risky and
wishes to improve its ALM position by holding more ZCBs of matching du-
ration. At the same time, management considers BU1 as being excessively
prudent in its investment and operational strategy and would like to explore
more proﬁtable opportunities by mismatching asset-liability position even
further.
They therefore consider the following three scenarios:
E. Reduce risk proﬁle of BU2: a portion of assets of BU2 previ-
ously invested in equity is reinvested in more ZCBs of the same
duration as insurance liabilities, so that now they cover 93% of
insurance liabilities. The ALM position is therefore improved,
having a positive impact on EC, but reducing expected return
from the assets;
F. Increase risk proﬁle of BU1: BU2 is changed as in Scenario E,
while BU1 is changing its current investment in ZCBs of the
same duration as insurance liabilities (15 years) into a shorter
term ZCBs (5 years) that are providing additional 2.5% p.a. of
return (i.e. doubling the original risk free interest rate earned
previously);
G. Mitigate risk for BU1: Again, BU2 is changed as in Scenario E,
while BU1 is changing its current investment in ZCBs into other
shorter term ZCBs now of duration 10 years that are providing
additional 1.5% p.a. of return (i.e. increasing the original risk
free interest rate previously earned by 60%).
RoEC and ROE results for these three scenarios are shown in Figure4.3,
comparatively to Scenario D that was chosen in the previous subsection
(note the change on the y-axis scale).
The analysis of the obtained results leads us to a number of comments:
• increased Risk-Adjusted performance from risk mitigation (BU2): both
standalone and diversiﬁed ROEC results of BU2, as well as the Group's
RoEC result, have been improved when moving from scenario D to
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Figure 4.3: Action 2 - Impact of changing the ALM proﬁle in terms of
ROEC and ROE
scenario E. It means that decrease in risk due to improving of ALM
position of BU2 is more valuable in terms of RoEC than decrease in
returns due to switch from equities to risk free return;
• decreased ROE from risk mitigation (BU2): note that the same action
(move from scenario D to E) is assessed as being negative in terms
of ROE both for BU2 and the Group's results, as this measure does
not allow for reduction in risk, but just registers decrease in expected
return;
• RAPM as a measure of the risk/return trade-oﬀ: when concerning
potential changes made to BU1's ALM, we see that BU1 is steadily
improving its standalone RoEC position when moving from scenario
E to F, and then from F to G. At the same time, we see that the di-
versiﬁed RoEC result of BU1 and the Group's RoEC result are taking
their minimums at scenario F and their maximums at scenario G. This
is an important example showing how RAPM (RoEC in our case) can
help in determining an optimal strategy in a situation where the alter-
natives cannot be assessed qualitatively (i.e. one cannot say which of
Scenarios E, F, G is better based just on their qualitative assessment,
as any increase of return in them is compensated by increase of risk
in ALM position, which cannot be easily measured without thorough
quantitative analysis similar to what we did);
• risk not captured by ROE: again, ROE results don't reﬂect any change
in the level of risk of BU1 in scenarios E, F, G and reﬂect just changes
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in expected return.
If the Top Management of the company were making their decisions refer-
ring to RoEC-based scenario assessment, scenario G would be chosen as the
optimal preferred strategy. Note that if management of the company were
basing their decisions just on the ROE results, other choices would have been
made.
4.2.3.4 Action 3. Investigating further risk mitigating actions
Having chosen scenario G in the previous step, the Top Management of the
company is now concerned about performance of BU3. Despite being the
most risky business unit in the Group, BU3 has had the highest diversiﬁed
RoEC result under scenario D due to its negative correlation with the rest
of the group and hence providing the highest diversiﬁcation beneﬁt to the
Group. However, the situation has changed under scenario G after ALM
position of BU1 and BU2 have been improved. Now both standalone and
diversiﬁed RoEC results of BU3 are the lowest among the three business
units. It means that the combined return-hedging-riskiness position of BU3 is
not optimal anymore and should be improved by some management actions.
Given this consideration, the management of the company is considering
three alternative scenarios that might improve both BU3's and the Group's
performances.
The scenarios considered are the following:
H. Reduce equity risk in BU3: namely, swap 100% of the equity
currently held by BU3 to the type of equity held by BU2 (which
is less risky and has lower expected return). All other features
of BU3's model remain unchanged;
I. Reduce riskiness of BU3 arising from operational activities: namely,
change the current business model of BU3 to the less risky busi-
ness model currently operated by BU26. Such change will lead to
6The business model may consist of such elements as types of insurance products writ-
ten, distribution channels and underwriting policies used, level of expenses born, pricing
policies applied and others. We appreciate that in practice changing a business model, or
making it equal to some other existing business model in particular, may not be an easy
task, and that our example signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes such consideration for demonstration
purposes.
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Figure 4.4: Action 3 - Impact of risk mitigating actions in terms of ROEC
and ROE
having the same distribution of underwriting results as BU2 cur-
rently has. All other features of BU3's model remain unchanged;
J. Increase asset-liability matching in BU3: ﬁnally, reduce riskiness
of BU3 that origins from its mismatched assets-liabilities posi-
tion. Namely, make this a similar swap of part of BU3's equity to
matching ZCBs as it was done for BU2 under scenario E. After
such change 93% of insurance liabilities (previously it was 64%)
will be covered by ZCBs of the same duration (15 years). All
other features of BU3's model remain unchanged.
RoEC and ROE results for these three scenarios are shown in Figure 4.4,
comparatively to scenario G that was chosen in the previous subsection (note
the change on the y-axis scale).
The analysis of the obtained results leads us to a number of comments:
• No major change in standalone performance: on a standalone RoEC
basis we can see only some insigniﬁcant changes in BU3 performance
(while BU1 and BU2 are unaﬀected). This is because the positive
impact of risk reduction under all three scenarios (H, I, J) is largely
overweighted by the opposite eﬀect of decrease in expected returns.
Diversiﬁcation beneﬁt is not included in this metric so any change in
risk mitigation (or hedging) results is not reﬂected here;
• Reduced hedging eﬀects: under scenario H (equity swap) we can see
deterioration of the BU3's diversiﬁed ROEC and Group's ROEC. This
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is because the hedge (due to negative correlation) that BU3's equity
had been providing against risky equities of BU1 and BU2 is not avail-
able anymore. This decrease in diversiﬁcation beneﬁt is not suﬃciently
compensated by reduction in riskiness of BU3's equity itself (from 30%
to 20%) and hence results in negative overall impact for diversiﬁed
BU3's and Group's ROEC results;
• Immateriality of equity volatility: scenario I (change in operational ac-
tivities) is much closer to the original scenario G than scenario H with
equity swap. The reason for this is that standard deviation of under-
writing results under both scenarios (G and I) is not material (2.5%
and 1.2% respectively) comparatively to equity's standard deviation
(30%). Therefore, although being reduced by more than 50%, eﬀects
from volatility reduction and corresponding reduction in hedge have
no signiﬁcant impact on overall ROEC results;
• Material savings arising from ALM in BU3: scenario J shows the best
results between all three scenarios as well as a noticeable improvement
from the starting scenario G. It can be seen for both standalone and
diversiﬁed ROEC of BU3, as well as the Group's ROEC. This result
is caused by two factors: signiﬁcant reduction in risk due to ALM im-
provement (similar eﬀect was seen for BU2 in scenario E), combined
with preserving a high diversiﬁcation beneﬁt due to negative corre-
lation of BU3's equity and underwriting results with the rest of the
Group;
• Risk not captured by ROE: ﬁnally, as in previous considerations, ROE
does not allow for risk and reﬂects just changes in the expected returns.
Therefore, all three scenarios (H, I, J) do have worse results than the
under original scenario G, as each of the three scenarios assumes some
reduction in the expected return.
Based on the ROEC assessment of the alternative scenarios, scenario J (i.e.
improvement of BU3's ALM position) would be the optimal scenario both
for BU3 and the Group as a whole.
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Figure 4.5: Summary - Impact of the actions taken in terms of RoEC and
ROE
4.2.3.5 Summary of actions taken
In the previous subsections we have considered a hypothetical company con-
sisting of three business units and three diﬀerent business decisions that
company's management was considering. Basing on the RAPM (namely
RoEC) assessment of diﬀerent alternatives, the Top Management has been
choosing optimal decisions in each situation.
Below we recall these optimal scenarios and put them on a single graph
to demonstrate how company's RoEC position was improving following the
corresponding management's decisions:
BASE: We have identical B/Ss, BU1 provides lower return and risk, BU2
is in the middle, and BU3 oﬀers highest return and risk. Also,
BU1 and BU2 are positively correlated, while BU3 is negatively
correlated with BU1 and BU2.
Action_1: Group reduces its exposure to BU3 while increasing its exposure
to BU1 (scenario D);
Action_2: BU1 deteriorates its ALM position seeking for higher investment
return, while BU2 is on the contrary improving its ALM position
on the cost of return reduction (scenario G);
Action_3: BU3 improves its ALM position similarly to BU2 in Scenario G,
leading to an increase in its hedging features (scenario J).
We see that all three decisions on Figure 4.5 lead to improvement of
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the total Group's performance in RoEC terms. The BUs' results are also
improving in average, although show less stable than the Group's results.
Interestingly, when assessing the same decisions in ROE on Figure 4.5,
we can see that each decision leads to worsening of both Group's and BUs'
performances (apart from Scenario G, in which the changed ALM position
leads to higher investment return). Such results are expected given that:
• ROE is reﬂecting just proﬁtability of BUs with no allowance for the
risk taken;
• all optimal decisions taken by the management involve some reduction
of company's risk on the cost of a reduced level of expected returns.
The dramatical diﬀerence between conclusions driven by RoEC and ROE
demonstrates the importance of having appropriately designed risk-adjusted
performance measure to be used as management information in the decision
making process.
We should also note that although we've been using a speciﬁc RoEC
measure based on EC determined as `value at risk' (VaR) at the 99.5%
percentile, other RAPMs could also have been used and would potentially
lead to similar conclusions for our model. Behaviour of diﬀerent RAPMs in
practice, however, can diﬀer due to more complicated models used there. In
particular, RAPM results and conclusions based on them may diﬀer when a
model has risk factors with heavy tails, especially when their distributions
are of diﬀerent shapes and cannot be scaled (as was the case in our model,
which was based on multivariate Normal distribution).
This exercise also showed that a very important role in assessing ma-
nagement decisions is played by the impact of diversiﬁcation beneﬁts,
measured at a Group level. This gets particularly relevant in moments of
deep regulatory evolution, like the one we are currently witnessing, which is
pushing the industry towards a new wave of M&A activity and consolidation,
as discussed, for instance, in [51]. An important challenge will then consist
in carefully consider the eﬀect of such M&A activities on diversiﬁcation be-
neﬁts, i.e. by using models based on appropriately deﬁned RAPMs in order
to properly reﬂect diversiﬁcation beneﬁts.
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4.3 Capital management strategies and dividends
policy
As requested by Regulators (see EIOPA guideline #36 in [46], for instance)
ﬁrms should have a capital management policy, which should include proce-
dures related to at least the following three main features:
• the projection and monitoring of the solvency position, thus including
any considerations about tiering (i.e. the quality of funds) and fungi-
bility of available capital (e.g. to monitor the existence of ring fenced
funds);
• policy and statements with regards to dividends distribution or can-
cellations;
• the development of a medium-term capital management plan.
A medium-term capital management plan should cover a time-horizon at
least consistent with the business plan time-horizon and include information
such as:
• foreseeable capital issuance and solvency projections;
• maturity and/or repayments arising from assets aﬀecting available ca-
pital;
• dividends' distribution policy.
To better qualify such concepts, in the next three subsection we:
• deﬁne how capital management plans are put together by insurers;
• provide two examples of dividends policy actually used in the market;
• show the results of the case study introduced in the previous section
after allowing for capital management actions.
4.3.1 Capital management planning in practice
The capital management plan of a ﬁrm lays out how the Top Management
aims at ensuring that shareholders' return on capital ambitions are met while
observing the Board-set risk appetite. In order to do this, available capital
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needs to be allocated to the various BUs, so that return on (allocated) capital
targets can be assigned to each single BU (so that a clear accountability of
targets can be envisaged). To achieve such targets, some capital measures
need to be planned and taken into account in the solvency projections. These
actions are listed and formalized in ﬁrm's capital management plan, and
typically include:
• the recapitalization plan for fast-growing Subsidiaries;
• the dividends distribution plan for the Holding Company and for each
subsidiary.
More precisely, the Top Management poses its commitment on the ability
to generate a certain amount of dividends to shareholders, who the Board
is representative of. Therefore, the actual dividends policy results to be put
together following ﬁve steps:
• Board deﬁnes the risk appetite and the overall return on capital target;
• Top Management allocates return on capital targets to the various BUs
and translates it into a target dividends policy;
• Top Management, with the support of the various business structures,
plans a way in order to achive such targets;
• Top Management projects the full balance sheet over the plan time
horizon with the support of business structures and of the Risk Ma-
nagement, who veriﬁes that risk appetite tolerances are not breached;
• when a strategy is found such that return-on-capital targets are achieved
while being in line with risk appetite, the plan gets approved by the
Board.
The strategy might involve a mix of:
• management actions, e.g. lowering the ﬁnancial guarantees embeed-
ded in new (and, where possibile, also in-force) business, changing the
management of unrealized capital gains/ losses, etc.;
• risk mitigating actions, e.g. changing the reinsurance structures, chang-
ing the strategic asset allocation, changing the asset-liability duration
mismatch;
4.3 Capital management strategies and dividends policy 95
• capital actions, e.g. proposing a recapitalization of the company or a
dividends cut.
4.3.2 Examples of dividends policy
Capital management actions depend on the risk appetite and on the target
remuneration the Top Management is required to observe / aims to achieve.
For example, a Group dividends policy may be composed of the following
six principles:
• Group solvency position after dividend distribution is in line with Risk
Appetite and suﬃcient to withstand stress scenarios deﬁned by Risk
Management;
• Holding Company Solvency II Ratio (also referred to as S-II Ratio)
after dividend distribution is kept higher than a certain threshold (risk
tolerance, e.g. 160%);
• Holding Company's dividends is kept in the range of 60% - 80% of
Group net proﬁts (e.g. 20% of the proﬁt should be reinvested in the
company);
• distributed dividends are capped at the ﬁrm's total statutory dis-
tributable reserves (i.e. distributable reserves such as revaluation re-
serves and carried-over proﬁts);
• subsidiaries' S-II Ratio after dividend distribution is higher than 150%;
• solvency position is suﬃcient (i.e. higher than a risk-capacity thresh-
old, e.g. 120%) after stress in the case of extraordinary dividend dis-
tribution.
Another example of dividends policy is the one published by Allianz in their
2015 ﬁnal report [1], also discussed by Morgan Stanley and Oliver Wyman
in [38].
The case of Allianz is interesting as the Group is one of the primary in-
surers that have been designated as Global Systemically Important Insurers
(or G-SIIs); as such, an additional buﬀer (over the minimum SCR ratio of
100%) is likely to be required, the so called Higher Loss Absorbency (HLA)
requirements which at the time of writing is likely to be equivalent to an
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additional 25ppts on the Solvency II ratio (i.e. roughly equivalent to a Stan-
dard & Poor's style `A' requirement versus the base `BBB' calibration of
Solvency II). However, to comfortably run the business and absorb the in-
herent volatility in the business (which will become clearer under Solvency
II), Allianz will choose to hold additional buﬀers over and above this min-
imum level of (approximately) 125%; hence the Group dividends policy is
likely to only apply as long as the Group's economic solvency ratio is sus-
tainably in excess of 160%. If the Group Solvency ratio is higher than 160%,
then Allianz's dividend policy is to pay 50% of net income as a dividend,
use another 20-30% of net income for M&A activities and keep the rest for
internal growth. Note that management has deﬁned a stress test as a sce-
nario leading to a reasonable hit to solvency, i.e. a combination of equity
markets falling, credit spreads widening and yields falling leading to around
30ppts decrease in the Solvency II ratio. This probably means that Allianz is
likely to conservatively maintain a double buﬀer over and above its G-SII
requirements; the extent of such double cover depends on the outcome of
scenarios stress testing (e.g. available capital should be such that also in a,
say, 1in10 stress scenario the solvency position is higher than 125%).
In general, the case of Allianz shows that the ability of ﬁrms to payout
dividends is inﬂuenced at least by three elements:
1. the ability of the ﬁrm to generate proﬁts - proﬁtability view ;
2. the risk proﬁle of the ﬁrms underlying such proﬁt generation - risk
view ;
3. the capital management strategy and the risk appetite of shareholders,
which inﬂuences the level of required economic capital - capital view.
Hence, the Risk-adjusted strategic framework introduced in section 2.2 is
best place to set up a dividends' optimization strategy, tailored to the speciﬁc
features of the ﬁrm.
4.3.3 Application to our case-study
We have extended the EC-model deﬁned in the section 4.2 to consider a
multi-year time-horizon and a simple capital management strategy.
Keeping in mind that the focus of this work is not on modelling accuracy,
we used the following assumptions:
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Table 4.7: Results of capital projections and dividends policy (M)
• the calibration of correlations and marginal distribution of the risk
factors is assumed unchanged over the time horizon;
• the change in available capital from a year to the following one is
allocated proportionally to each asset class;
• being a pretty risk-adverse Group, the risk appetite is set to be equal
to a prudent 284% over the whole projection period, so that
RECt + Excess capital
REC
= 284% ∀t ∈ [1, ..., T ]
• the target dividends level is set to be equal to 10m every year.
Results are summarized in Table 4.7 and lead to two ﬁnal comments.
The ﬁrst relates to the fact that, also thanks to diversiﬁcation beneﬁts
and to the management initiatives set up in the previous section, the di-
vidends ﬂow appears to be pretty stable over time; however, the company
should carefully consider the fact that every year it is requesting investors
to raise some capital (between 3 and 6 m): albeit this is a relatively small
amount, the Board should probably consider either to relax its risk appetite
(284% is a very high threshold to maintain!) or to foster returns.
The second comment relates to the key proﬁtability metric to be used:
indeed, the closest metric to dividends generation appears to be the Sustain-
able Free Surplus generated (see deﬁnition in section 2.6), i.e. a new measure
which is starting to become best practice in the industry. For instance, in
their 3Q investor day 2015, the Top Management of Credit Suisse stated
that their strategy is to focus on free capital, both to fund growth and to
generate return for shareholders, as other proﬁt based metrics such as pre-
tax income and return on equity ignore increases in capital usage, i.e. can
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have high net income but be capital consumptive. They are rather going to
be increasingly using Sustainable Free Surplus Generated as it is able to
• assess the overall performance of Credit Suisse Group;
• guide the capital allocation;
• provide a proxy as a target for dividends;
• act as a metric to measure divisional performance.
The four reasons above can duely be considered a good way to ensure that
a metric is actually embedded in the ﬁrm's decision making process, and
therefore is meaningful in the sense used by de Finetti [17].
4.4 Using EC to link product pricing with ORSA
Having described how an EC model can be used in order to deﬁne business
initiatives and capital actions, this section focuses on how a risk-adjusted
performance framework can inﬂuence product pricing. This is consistent
with EIOPA's Guideline #13 of [49], which states that ﬁrms should take
into account the results of ORSA and the insights gained during the ORSA
process in product development and pricing.
In order to do so, in the next subsection we:
• introduce the drivers which are fostering a revolution in product pri-
cing;
• highlight the key features of a new pricing approach based on risk-
adjusted performance targets;
• discuss a few remarks on such evolution and related perspectives.
4.4.1 Three elements which are fostering a pricing revolution
At least three elements are pushing the industry towards a complete review
of the way insurance products are priced:
• the regulatory push related to ORSA, involving the requirement to
consider risk in every strategic and management choice;
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• the will to capitalize the important investments placed on risk ma-
nagement framework, risk modelling methodology and IT infrastuc-
ture;
• the business need to evolve the way insurers think of pricing towards
a more market (rather than technical) centered approach.
Regarding the ﬁrst element, apart from the already mentioned EIOPA guide-
lines, a number of national Regulators explicitly require ﬁrms to assess their
own strategy related to product development and structuring in light of
ORSA ﬁndings. They should also make an assessment, for each newly new
product, of the following four components, to be documented in a technical
report (see, for instance, the recently approved Italian law-suit related to
Solvency II [45]):
• insurable risks covered by the product;
• hypotheses underlying the pricing process;
• expected proﬁtability;
• expected premium equilibrium.
Hence, while technical sustainability should still be checked by actuaries
using the well-established traditional actuarial pricing methodologies (see,
for instance [52]), the innovation which actuarial research has recently begun
to investigate is to move from pricing models which do not represent the
speciﬁc risk proﬁle of the product towards a new pricing approach which is
based on the actual risk proﬁle of the product in the context of the pre-existing
product portfolio.
In order to achieve such target, three principles should be introduced in
the way products are priced:
1. coherence with the Risk Appetite, in order to appropriately considering
risk given investors' preferences;
2. coherence with the overall proﬁtability target, promised to shareholders
and formalized in the dividends policy;
3. coherence with the Economic Capital structure of the ﬁrms, thus con-
sidering the various risks taking diversiﬁcation beneﬁts into account.
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In the next subsection, we present an approach which translates such princi-
ples into an approach which ensures that pricing is consistent with the target
remuneration and risk appetite.
4.4.2 A new RAP-target approach for product pricing
In this sub-section we suggest a way to merge the RAP-target and the tech-
nical pricing approaches.
The high-level pricing process consist of 4 main steps:
1. data and risk mapping: collect information about insurable risks co-
vered by the contract and identify the key risk drivers (e.g. age of the
insured, city of residence etc., depending on their focus);
2. techincal pricing: calibrate the pricing formula as a function of the
identiﬁed key risk drivers and calculate technical pricing (including
foreseeable covered claims and expenses);
3. proﬁt testing: make valuation assumptions (interest rate scenario, CAT
scenario, etc.) and measure standalone product proﬁtability assuming
technical pricing (so called proﬁt testing);
4. commercial distribution: agree with the distribution structures (under-
writers, agents, commercial banks) the pricing ﬂexibility range (e.g. in
terms of discounts) depeding on technical price and proﬁt test results.
When we move to a RAP-target approach, the main idea is that the product
features, risk proﬁle and pricing should be such that the allocated target
RAPM should be hit. Hence, the process becomes the following:
1. allocation of proﬁt and REC, i.e. allocation of proﬁtability and re-
quired economic capital to each business unit and product;
2. deﬁnition of a RAP-target, for each new product, consistent with the
overarching return of capital targets and risk appetite set by the Board;
3. assessment of the RAP-targeting premium, i.e. calculation of the mi-
nimum price which ensures that the product hits the RAPM-target and
assessment of technical sustainability (considering expected claims and
expenses);
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4. deﬁnition of an optimal price, considering commercial factors such as
competitors pricing, brand recognition, elasticity of demand and supply
etc.
Step 1 (Allocating proﬁts to ensure accountability) While we al-
ready discussed key features, challenges and solutions related to allocation
of required economic capital in Chapter 2, in this paragraph we focus on
allocation of proﬁtability, as a lever of the Top Management to ensure that
the right incentives are given to business structures.
Regulators, rating agencies and investment markets have recently put
increasing attention on risk controls embedded within the ﬁnancial institu-
tions they monitor, rate and value. At the same time, risk management can
now rely on increased computational capabilities and more complex models.
As noted by Shang & Chen in [45], those factors, however, did not prevent
ﬁnancial institutions from going bankrupt or needing government bailout,
notwithstanding defaulted ﬁrms stating they had good risk management
policies and implementation and not trivial amounts of resources spent on
risk management.
It therefore appears to be crucial to make sure that the risk management
process does not resolve to be a compliance exercise, but rather proves to
be embedded in the daily management of the business. The stated objective
of a RAPM framework is to enable ﬁrms to maximise shareholder value
given their risk appetite and taking the opportunity cost of capital into
consideration. Identifying the appropriate set of incentives is the best way
to force senior management to think in terms of risk-return. In particular, the
performance of a business should be translated into speciﬁc Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs), which the managers' performance scorecards should be
related to.
For instance, economic measures such as RAROC and EVA (discussed
in chapter 2) have increasingly been adopted by banks to evaluate three of
the main functions usually responsible for diﬀerent risks:
• Investment function: responsible for actively managing an asset port-
folio, departing from the base (passive) strategy (so called Strategic
Asset Allocation  SAA7) in order to achieve higher returns than ex-
7The Strategic Asset Allocation (SAA) is used to determine a long-term policy port-
folio reﬂecting the desired systematic risk exposure. Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA), on
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pected;
• ALM function: responsible for minimizing mismatch between assets
and liabilities;
• Business Management function: responsible for new business growth
and gains from non-ﬁnancial risks.
In Life insurance companies, where longer periods than in banks are required
before gaining proﬁts, MCEV is a good candidate for measuring economic
value and economic proﬁt. MCEV can be decomposed into value generated
by the three functions listed above as follows (and illustrated in Figure 4.6):
• higher return than assumed using the SAA following any active asset
management strategies are due to the Investment function. For exam-
ple, if interest rates are expected to go up, the investment department
may decide to increase the duration of assets compared to the duration
of liabilities;
• the diﬀerence between the SAA return and return gained on the repli-
cating portfolio of liabilities is earned due to the mismatch between
assets and liabilities, and should therefore be attributed to the ALM
function;
• the diﬀerence in values of the replicating portfolio and actual liabilities
(if it occurs) is due to any other non-ﬁnancial risks and should be
attributed to the business management function.
Remark 4.7 on economic value added by single functions Note
that any extra return should be adjusted for the additional cost of capital
required. For example, an increase in the A-L duration mismatch leads to
higher expected proﬁts, but also to higher Required Economic Capital, as
discussed in the simulation in section 4.2.
Using this approach, it is possible to calculate the Economic Value Added
by each function, for example as shown in Table 4.8, following the generic
the other hand, speciﬁes the allowable deviation from SAA to take advantage of short-
term market opportunities. The investment department can therefore manage an asset
portfolio actively as long as the resulting portfolio does not stray outside the allowable
range speciﬁed by the TAA.
4.4 Using EC to link product pricing with ORSA 103
Figure 4.6: MCEV-based allocation of proﬁts
Function Allocated proﬁt Explanation
Investment EV AInv =

rP −
rSAA −
CoC ·RECInv
{
Extra return over SAA −
delta in cost of capital
ALM EV AALM =
{
rSAA −
rL−R.ptf
{
Return from SAA mismatch −
Replicating ptf of liabilities
Business Mgmt EV ABM =

NBV +
E [rL−R.ptf ] +
pi −
CoC ·RECBM

NewBusinessV alue +
Return on replicating ptf +
Non− financial profit −
Cost of capital
Table 4.8: Example of allocation of proﬁt among functions
approach of
EV A = earnings− opportunity cost · allocated capital
Further details on the measures deﬁned above can be found in [45].
Step 2. (Deﬁnition of a product-speciﬁc RAP-target) Say that
the chosen RAPM is Return on Risk Adjusted Capital (RoRAC) and that a
company sets RoRAC∗t as the target return to be achieved for holding an
economic capital consistent with the Board-deﬁned Risk Appetite.
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Then, the Top Management will have to cascade such target down to
each Business Unit until a product granularity level. Therefore, a RoRAC
target will be set for a given product i which is launched at time t as the
following:
RoRAC∗i;t =
r∗i;t,t+1 (RoRAC
∗
t )
RECit
(4.1)
where
• r∗i;t,t+1 is the return needed from product i in the next year in order to
achieve the ﬁrm's target RoRAC∗t given information at time t;
• RECit is the amount of economic capital allocated to product i that
the ﬁrm is required to hold at time t in order to be consistent with the
risk appetite of the ﬁrm.
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Remark 4.8 Two important challenges arise in order to allocate capital
at product level:
• allocating REC at product level might prove to be a technical challenge
for ﬁrms which calculate it using a standard formula approach, as the
highest level of granularity in the standard formula SCR calculation is
by line of business;
• for portfolios selling multiple products in multiple geographies and
markets, cascading a RoRAC target for a new product is likely to
be a highly discretionary exercise, given that volumes are such that a
single new product is likely not to materially impact the risk-return
proﬁle at ﬁrm's level (i.e. the RoRAC∗t ).
Regarding the ﬁrst challenge, standard formula companies are developing
ways to allocate capital at product level using LoB's capital absorption.
In the non-life case, for example, a solution companies are implementing
involves three steps:
• identify the LoBs which the product is a mix of;
• calculate capital absorptions at LoB level (e.g. by using an Euler allo-
cation method);
• allocated capital to the product as a linear combination of the LoBs.
Regarding the second challenge, the weight of the product-speciﬁc risk-
adjusted proﬁtability target (RoRAC∗i;t) will clearly need to be weighted
by the product budget over next year; if the impact on the overall ﬁrm's tar-
get (RoRAC∗t ) is still negligible, then the Top Management will need to take
a view on how to cascade the target by product. At the end, target setting
is more a strategic activity (albeit informed by quantitative assessments)
rather than a pure technical exercise.
Step 3. (Assessment of the RAP-targeting premium) Following
step 2, a target RoRAC has been deﬁned for any product i as RoRAC∗i;t.
The next step involves ﬁnding the premium pi∗RAP (which we will call as the
RAP-targeting premium) that allows to achieve the target product-RoRAC
and is also coherent with the proﬁle of the insurable risk and of the ﬁrms
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cost structure. In other words, it should be checked that the RAP-targeting
premium enables premium equilibrium in a more traditional actuarial sense.
Consistently with the pricing model 3.6 introduced in chapter 3, we there-
fore have:
pi∗RAP ∴
pi∗RAP (1 + r0,1)− E [X (1 + e%)]
RECit
= RoRAC∗i;t
Step 4. (Deﬁnition of an optimal price) Once we have deﬁned a mi-
nimum premium which allows hitting the risk-adjusted proﬁtability targets
and is sustainable from an actuarial perspective, the goal of the underwriting
and distribution processes is to ﬁnd an optimal price, i.e. a price (at least
equal to the RAP-targeting premium) which adds the most economic value.
In order to achieve this aim, the pricing policy should:
• be sensitive to demand elasticiy (e.g. increasing prices for products
with a low demand elasticity creates value because the loss of volumes
is more than compensated by the increased price);
• carefully consider the availability of substitutes and the competitive
behaviour (e.g. using a game-theoretic approach, anticipating how
competitors will react to any change in prices);
• allow for some discretion at the point of sale, in order to extract the
most consumer value;
• closely monitor the use of delegated price authorities and promotions;
• react quickly to pricing cycles and changing ﬁnancial conditions.
Further discussions on the factors above to be considered while setting up
an optimal pricing policy are provided, for example, by Wilson in [52].
4.4.3 Remarks and perspectives of this revolution
It has been argued that adopting a risk-based approach in pricing is not
really a revolution, given that absorbed risk-adjusted capital is often allowed
for already while doing a proﬁt testing. However, most of the times such tests
are based on product standalone capital, i.e. as if that product was the only
product which the ﬁrm is selling. The key innovation is that the assessment
needs to be based on how much capital the product absorbes given the wider
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company's portfolio. In other words, from a ﬁrm's strategic perspective the
aim is to investigate the eﬀect of the new product on the ﬁrms risk-return
proﬁle.
This provides a double sided eﬀect:
• on the positive side, it gives information to the company as to what
sort of business they would have a comparative advantage in selling,
compared to competitors;
• on the more arguable side, this pricing approach might lead, for a
single insurable risk, to as many prices as selling insurers: for a given
insurable risk, premium will not be unique anymore.
For instance, a non-life retail product providing a CAT cover might be more
attractive to a company A which appears to be too concentrated on, say,
motor business and on market risks (so that selling CAT guarantess might
provide a good hedging opportunity) than to a company B which is already
overly exposed to the same CAT risks. This will allow company A to
provide the CAT cover at a lower price than company B, so that the CAT
cover for company B becomes either unsellable (as the price is much
higher than that oﬀered by for company A) or un-sustainable (as the price
is too loow considering its risk-return proﬁle).
Believers in the free market will ﬁnd this to actually be a fully positive
impact, as it creates favourable conditions to insurers who:
• are provided with methodologies, processes and infrastructure able to
correctly implement a RAP-target product pricing approach;
• have a genuine competitive advantage in selling certain guarantees
compared to peers.
To conclude, such evolution in product pricing also has an impact on the go-
vernance side, where ﬁrms are setting up and strenghtening products com-
mittees. Such committees are evolving, from being an (albeit important)
moment where a new product is discussed from a marketing and from an
actuarial perspective, to become a central enabler of business strategy steer-
ing and execution, in which risk and capital management play a key role in
order to deﬁne products which are proﬁtable and consistent with the ﬁrm's
capital management plan and risk appetite framework.
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This concludes the discussion on how a risk-adjusted framework can be
used in order to deﬁne a value-creating strategy through re-deﬁning the
concepts of business planning, capital management and product pricing.
Chapter 5
Outlook of insurers' operating
model, investors' views and
actuaries' role
By designing Solvency II as the new regime for the insurance industry, the
European regulator played the role of a game changer, forcing ﬁrms to de-
velop new ways to assess their own business and actively manage risks and
capital.
The next page of this journey towards a new way in managing the perfor-
mance of insurance ﬁrms by using economic capital materializes into three
factors:
• the way insurance ﬁrms operate: insurers are looking for optimal ways
to make full use of the huge modelling and IT investments made in
the past few years; in order to do this, business processes should be
re-designed, so that risk is properly taken into account and decision
making is based on economic capital assessments;
• the way insurance ﬁrms are valued: the insurance industry is a very
diﬀerent (and complex) business compared to anyone else; as such,
it cannot be valued like other industries, but speciﬁc measures are re-
quired in order to understand the peculiarity of this business; the newly
deﬁned economic capital based metrics (the RAPMs) provide investors
with new information which can be used to make more informed deci-
sion when trading insurers;
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• the essence of actuaries and of their role: in such a chaning land-
scape, actuaries evolve from being pure technical specialists (often
liability-oriented) to becoming professionals equipped with the right
skills, knowledge and mindset in order to steer, inﬂuence or control the
strategy of a ﬁrm.
The next sections expand the three factors introduced above, and provide
the perspective ahead of the insurance industry following from the scientiﬁc
itinerary followed in this thesis, on the ways economic capital can be used
to manage the insurance business by deﬁning a new risk-based corporate
ﬁnance.
5.1 A new EC-based operating model for insurers
This thesis chapter provided an iter across:
• technical remarks on how to calculate, allocate and use Economic Ca-
pital in order to deﬁne a Risk-Adjusted Performance measurement sy-
stem for the company (chapter 2);
• an application showing how setting up a RAPM-based system makes
the sustainable proﬁt of a company much more volatile (chapter 3);
• a simulation model showing how an Economic Capital can be used in
order to design optimal management initiatives and how these diﬀer
from a traditional ROE-based approach (chapter 4).
In order to turn such methodological advances into practice ﬁrms need to set
up processes and organizational structures which enable to eﬀectively steer
the business considering risks and optimally managing economic capital. In
other words, a new EC-based operating model for insurers is needed.
The new operating model is based on the following building blocks:
1. Strategic steering processes: these include setting up the return on
capital targets and the risk appetite of shareholders; these are typi-
cally driven directly by the Board of Directors, with support from Top
Management and Risk Management function;
2. Budgeting and Capital management plan: Top Management allocates
capital to the various business units, legal entities (if it is a Group)
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and business processes (e.g. investments, underwriting, etc.); such
capital allocation exerise is included in a draft capital management
plan, which also includes the projected use of capital (including any
dividends to be distributed/ capital injections to be requested); the
capital management plan cannot be closed if the ORSA exercise (see
process below) has not been ﬁnalized;
3. Cascading of targets and risk appetite: in this phase, Top Manage-
ment sets proﬁtability targets and risk limits for each business unit
and business process, consistently with targets posed by the Board;
4. ALM and Strategic Asset Allocation: this includes how assets and li-
abilities are managed in a unique value framework; further discussions
on Strategic Asset Allocation, in particular, can be found in the pre-
vious chapter;
5. Product Planning and Reinsurance: new business should be planned
considering commercial elements (e.g. costumer needs, competitive
landscape) as well as the risk-return proﬁle of the ﬁrm (ALM and
ORSA ﬁndings); similarly, the policy of a ﬁrm towards reinsurance can
be informed by the desire to save capital or to explore opportunities in
new peculiar lines of business (e.g. catastrophe covers);
6. Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA): this also includes the for-
ward looking assessment of own risks (both capital and pillar 2 risks),
projections of solvency positions (and thus deﬁnition of dividends) and
scenario and reverse stress testing (and contingency planning), in order
to assess the sustainability, proﬁtability and dividends policy achieved
by the ﬁrm's capital management plan, strategic asset allocation and
product plan, considering the tarket return on capital and risk appetite;
7. Sign-oﬀ of Strategic Plan and ORSA report: the Board should sign
oﬀ the Strategic plan and the ORSA report (including evidence of
the capital management plan, of the strategic asset allocation, of the
product plan and of the reinsurance policy); these two documents,
should be disclosed, respectively, to the market and to the Regulator;
8. Regular business processes: once the plan has been signed oﬀ, it needs
to be implemented; this is done by the various business units/ depart-
5.1 A new EC-based operating model for insurers 112
ments responsible for each business process, such as investments (often
responsible for the Tactical Asset Allocation), underwriting (which, for
instance launch the new products in the market and often price them,
together with the actuarial function, taking economic capital into con-
sideration), and reserving; note that each business process needs to be
monitored in terms of performance target and risk limits (the so-called
ﬁrst line of defence);
9. Sign-oﬀ of Balance Sheet and QRTs1: the ex-post evidence of results
achieved with the realization of the strategic plan needs to be regularly
reported to the Top Management (so called management information)
and to the Board and disclosed to the market and to the Regulator;
the huge amount of information produced should therefore inform the
ﬁrm's decision making process and external assessment (of market,
investors, rating agencies and supervisors) as well as provide a basis
for the next planning exercise.
While the Regulator doesn't prescribe any speciﬁc operating model ﬁrms
should refer to, each company is free to design the model which best suit its
history and vision towards the future. Above we provided an example of how
an insurance operating model might work in practice, so the numeration also
reﬂect the cronological order a ﬁrm might choose to roll out such processes.
3 remarks on ORSA To date, the general industry view of ORSA has
been that it is a regulatory requirement introduced by Solvency II. In reality,
ORSA is set to mark a step change in how risk and economic capital manage-
ment is embedded in an insurer's planning processes and day-to-day decision
making. To enable such step change three remarks are to be considered.
Remark 5.1 on Stress testing
Properly including stress testing in any ORSA exercise means linking the
stresses to the plan assumptions (scenario analysis) as well as identifying
the break scenarios which would signiﬁcantly impact the company (the so
called critical scenarios already mentioned in 2.5.4); results of stress testing
should also lead to the design of contingency plans, suited to the ﬁrm's
characteristics (i.e. think about what would you do if things went wrong?)
1Quantitative Reporting Template, required by Solvency II and providing detailed
information about the company's solvency position every quarter
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Remark 5.2 on Connection with the Business as Usual (BaU)
The risk proﬁle and the economic solvency position of the ﬁrm assessed in
the ORSA process should play a central role in pretty much all the other
strategic and business processes:
• the ORSA should coincide with the planning activity (and the Board
sign oﬀ of strategic plan should come alongside with the sign oﬀ of
the ORSA report), so that business direction and strategic decision
making are deﬁned in line with the insurer's overall risk appetite;
• the capital management plan should be adjusted considering the
ORSA; for instance, the dividends policy is an outcome of the solvency
ratio projection depending on the risk appetite of the ﬁrm; ORSA va-
luations should also help the Top Management to steer the company
growth by balancing capital and returns, using the allocation of eco-
nomic capital as a lever to optimize risk-return trade-oﬀ;
• assets and liabilities should be managed so that the level of risk is co-
herent with the ﬁrm's risk appetite whilst hitting proﬁtability targets;
a Strategic Asset Allocation probably is the best example of how this
can be achieved, and should be assessed through ORSA projections;
• new business pricing should be adjusted for risk, considering economic
capital loadings based the ORSA projections;
• ORSA valutation should take the accurate (and huge amount of) in-
formation provided by disclosures (e.g. the QRTs), but may not neces-
sarily be based on them (e.g. it should reﬂect an internal assessment
of non quantiﬁed risks, i.e. the so-called Solvency II Pillar 2 risks, such
as Reputational, Strategic, Contagion and Compliance risks, which are
not included in standard disclosures).
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Remark 5.3 on Business sustainability
In order to make ORSA a truely comprehensive assessment of a ﬁrm, it
should not only focus on risk and solvency position, but also on its prof-
itability proﬁle. This means that the assessment should include a view on
how proﬁtable the ﬁrm is (rather than only how risky or how solvent it is),
and where this proﬁtability comes from.
A ﬁrst step towards this direction has been made by EIOPA in requesting
internal model ﬁrms to perform Proﬁt and Loss Attribution, as a standard to
ensure that their internal model covers all material risk factors which origi-
nate proﬁt and losses. However, the insurance industry is still far from what
the banking industry named the Business Model Analysis (BMA); this is
a component of the Supervisory Review Evaluation Process (SREP), which
supervisors are requested to perform on regulated entities. BMA means ver-
ifying how the business model of the bank is proﬁtable and sustainable both
in the short and medium-long time period (see original documentation from
the ECB [23] for further details). Taking risk-adjusted proﬁtability as a key
metric to be assessed, ORSA may therefore be used not only to assess but
also to optimize return on capital targets, as discussed in chapter 4.
Following these three remarks would mean enabling a ﬁrm to extract
value from ORSA beyond mere regulatory compliance, so that it supports
a clear understanding of the risk and return trade-oﬀs of various strategic
decisions. Who leads the ORSA (often the Risk Management function), will
therefore evolve into a business sparring partner that contributes towards
a continuous and tailored risk assessment, through systems able to perform
projections and what-if analyses, in order to support the other business func-
tions, not to limit them.
5.2 A summary template to value the ﬁrm
As explained throughout this thesis, Economic Capital provides the Top
Management with a wide variety of indicators which can be used in order to
inform decision making process. However, regulations are in place in order
to push companies to disclose a huge amount of data to the market, which
investors can use in order to assess the company. Some of these indicators
have been deﬁned and used in this thesis.
Figure 5.1 shows a mapping of key indicators structured by Proﬁtability
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Figure 5.1: Mapping of performance indicators for insurers by proﬁtability,
volumes and capital/risk view
vs. Volumes (i.e. Growth) and Capital/Risk views. For instance, a way to
capture Economic Value Added (proﬁtability view) and Equity (capital view)
leads to the deﬁnition of a RARoC performance metric. For a deﬁnition of
terms not deﬁned earlier, such as New Business Margin and Leverage Ratio,
see, for instance, [38]. The mapping is complemented by three key ingredients
of the status and strategy of a ﬁrm, i.e. the quality of its available economic
capital, the risk appetite which the required economic capital is calibrated
on and the capital allocation across BUs.
In an economic capital based world, it is important that ﬁrms start in-
forming their business decisions using summary templates similar to the one
above, related to diﬀerent Business Units or to diﬀerent strategic option (e.g.
if dealing with a decision of either (a) implementing initiatives to evolve a
BU which is currently loss-making or (b) putting it into run-oﬀ, it would be
interesting to see what the impact would be in each case in terms of projected
Solvency II ratio, projected proﬁts, and Net Present Value).
Similarly, market players interested in investing in the insurance industry
might want to fully understand the fundamentals of the business, rather than
rely on more traditional cross-industry multiples, such as price to earnings.
Wilson [52] demonstrates that price to earnings, for instance, is actually
5.3 The rise of strategic actuaries 116
ﬂawed for the insurance sector, as it ignores the capital required to generate
the earnings (i.e. more speciﬁcally, whether the marginal capital invested
for growth creates or destroyes value by generating earnings in excess of the
risk-adjusted cost of capital); the P/E measure should rather be replaced
by a more market-consistent M/B ratio2.
In summary, Economic Capital and RAPMs provide an important step
forward towards a more coherent, forward-looking and comprehensive as-
sessment of insurance ﬁrms which investors should leverage in order to make
more informed investment choices when dealing with the insurance sector.
5.3 The rise of strategic actuaries
As described throughout this thesis, the perfomance of an insurance company
can be managed to become more stable and proﬁtable using economic capital.
In such a new risk-based corporate ﬁnance, three ingredients are necessary:
• sound quantitative bases, in order to be able to master the methodology
behind the calculation and allocation of economic capital and derived
RAPMs;
• deep expertise in the dynamics of the insurance business, as the insurers
operate in a very peculiar and complex sector;
• ability to drive the two ingredients above with a strategic attitute.
Looking at actuaries as potential professionals provided with the ingredients
above, the UK's Faculty and Institute of Actuaries already deﬁnes actuar-
ies as problem solvers and strategic thinkers with a deep understanding of
the ﬁnancial systems and highly valued mathematical skills and expertise,
which they use in order to measure the probability and risk of future events.
It seems therefore that a risk-based corporate ﬁnance requires actuaries to
further evolve from the traditional focus onf insurance liabilities.
Indeed, looking at actuarial types, it has been argued that four types of
actuaries existed in the history of actuarial sciences; the passage of actuaries
2It is argued that the price the market is willing to pay for a company is equal to its
current book equity plus the growing perpetuity of excess returns generated by reinvesting
returns net of dividends to grow the business ( V
E0
= 1 + RoE−CoC·E0
CoC·E0−gE ); using the P/E
ratio, however, the theoretical price of a share is equal to the present value of its growing
dividends ﬂow distributed to shareholders ( P
Ea
= d
CoC·E0−gE ). See [52] for further details
on this topic.
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from a kind to the next one provided a change both on a market level and
on skillset level:
• First kind: The ﬁrst generation of actuaries emerged in the 17th cen-
tury, were focused on life insurance valuations and tended to use de-
terministic methods;
• Second kind: Developed in the beginning of 20th century, these are ca-
sualty actuaries who used probabilistic approaches to deal with workers
compensation, automobile insurance, property insurance and similar
risks;
• Third kind: Actuaries of the third kind typically had an investment
focus, able to apply stochastic processes, contingent claims and deriva-
tives to assets and liabilities; these developed in the 1980s as ﬁnancial
risk became more important and tools to manage ﬁnancial risk were
created;
• Fourth kind: This kind of actuaries developed deep expertise in Enter-
prise Risk Management, and were the ﬁrst structurally able to work
outside the ﬁnancial industry; the development of these led to the cre-
ation of professional qualiﬁcation such as CERA3.
Buhlmann ﬁrst oﬀered the classiﬁcation of the ﬁrst three types of actuaries
in [7], while the fourth was suggested by Embrechts in 2005 and speciﬁed by
Archy in [2].
We argue that the ﬂourishing of Economic Capital as a concept to manage
insurers' performance may lead to the proliferation of a a further kind of
actuaries, i.e. professionals who expand their quantitative and technical
background to a wider risk-based corporate ﬁnance (including the use of
new techniques, e.g. Big Data and parallel computing) and use their skills
in order to enhance the performance of the company and thus set up the
strategy to be followed: in two words, strategic actuaries.
In other words, the recent developments posed by the regulators (on one
side) as well as the huge challeges faced by public welfare systems (on the
other) are leading to the need of professionals who may revert towards the
core business of actuaries, i.e. insurance and uncertainty management;
however this will be done with two distinctive features:
3Chartered Enterprise Risk Actuary
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• the focus on strategy, proﬁtability and sustainability of the business;
• the attention towards public policy and regulatory framework.
While the former feature has extensively been discussed in this thesis, the
latter ﬁnds the following two good examples today:
• in the UK's Government Actuary's Department, i.e. an institution
whose mission is to support eﬀective decision-making and robust re-
porting within government as the ﬁrst choice provider of actuarial and
specialist analysis, advice and assurance. Scope of actuarial contri-
bution on public policy matters can range from pensions policy and
regulation to statistical and actuarial analysis (e.g. on longevity of the
population), from investment and strategic risk management to CAT
risk management and healthcare ﬁnancing;
• in the recent experience of the Italian National Insurance Institute for
work-related risks (INAIL), which recently completed a project aimed
at enhancing the data quality and IT architecture of nation-wide ca-
sualty data, which are now open for public use [29]; this was pushed
by the Italian government, whose ministers of Economics and Finance
and Job and Welfare requested INAIL to verify the economic, ﬁnan-
cial and actuarial sustainability [31] of the Institute, considered to be
of public interest.
It follows that actuaries have the chance to play an important strategic role
also to inform strategic decisions in public policy. After all, the ethimology
itself of the word strategy (from the ancient greek στρατηγo`ς, general of
the army) refers to the science of eﬀectively coordinating the movements of
an army, mastered by generals in ancient Greece and roman empire times;
more broadly, Aristotle referred to rhetorical strategy as the research for the
success in a competitive context.
The strategic actuary, therefore, should focus on developing advanced
risk-based corporate ﬁnance models and use them to identify actions and ini-
tiatives which would maximise value creation, considering the standpoint of
shareholders (proﬁtability), policyholders (solvency, or safety) and the mar-
ket in general (sustainability).
Hence, coming back to the insurance industry, the changed regulatory
landscape, including Solvency II, as well as the new wave of economic capital
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focused business models, give actuaries the opportunity to further evolve
from more traditional activities, such as liability valuation (even in the most
recent forms, such as the setup of the actuarial function), towards being key
resources equipped with the right quantitative and technical skills to play a
key (top management?) role in business steering in order to ﬁnd the right
balance among growth, stability and proﬁtability, in a new Risk-Adjusted
Performance system.
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